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POINT I
"Defendant protests that he was hampered in his
efforts to prove truthfulness by being denied
discovery of certain evidence. However, a review
of the records indicates that although defendant
had responsibility to compel timely discovery, he
did not pursue it. See Utah R. C|v. P. No. 37.
Further,
some
of
defendant's
request
for
admissions dealt with totally irrelevant issues
pertinent only to another case. Other requests
related
to documents
and
tranlscripts
which
defendant could have easily introduced at trial
but did not. Therefore, we find this assignment
of error to be totally without merit."
Opinion, Pg. 6, Paragraph 4.
This statement is totally inaccurate, and tarings up the question Did

any of

the

appellate

judges

read

Point Jl of Appellant's

Brief?

Appellant did pursue discovery under the ver^ same rule, Rule 37 the
Court stated appellant did not use.
Had the Court read Point I or reviewed the documents referred to in
Point I of Appellant's Brief, they would have fouhd:
1.

Appellant specifically moved to Compel (Discovery under Rule 37,

R. 48. (ADD. 1)
2.

Appellant filed a Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions,

pursuant to the provisions of Rule 37, (2), (3), (4), of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure R,61. (ADD. 2)
3.

Appellant's

Compel,

asking

attorney, Mr. Robert Sherlock, filed a Motion
the Court

"For

an

Order

Compelling

Plaintiff

to
to

Respond to those Interrogatories and Request! for Document Production
previously filed herein," R. 189. (ADD. 3)

- 1

4.

Judge Fishier recognized the Motion to Compel by defendant Mann

was

still

pending,

R.

197(4).

(ADD. 4)

Mr.

Sherlock

repeatedly

attempted to get this detailed review accomplished but Judge Fishier
told him he was not going to allow it, but he would not put it in
writing.

Judge Fishier did not allow the discovery nor would he ever

deny this Motion in writing.
5.

Appellant filed a Motion to Compel pursuant to Rule 37, R. 254 &

R. 255. (ADD. 5)
At the same hearing defendant filed "Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute".

R. 269-277. (ADD. 6) This Motion discussed more in detail

the background of defendant's attempts to compel and again the Motions
were taken under advisement by the Court R. 287. (ADD. 7)
is irrefutable that this Court erred when

stating

The evidence

"he did not pursue

It."
The fact

remains, and

the

Record

verifies, appellant

was

denied

discovery on the very cases which were listed as sources of the material
in the back of the book, "One Against the Storm".
Complaint, R. 157 to R. 158, (ADD. 8)
of all

their allegations,

and

as

the

In the revised Amended

Mr. Christensen details the source
cause

of

action

in the

suit,

.specifically as: P-79-2 (hereinafter "Custody Action") R. 157(6) (ADD. 8)
C-79-4063 (hereinafter "Trust Action") R. 157(6) (ADD. 8) and C-79-0772H
(hereinafter

"Tort

Action")

R.

158(6X7)

(ADD.

8)

The

discovery

appellant was refused related to the plaintiff Wadsworth's acts, solely
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in these three suits named in all three revisions of their
with

Complaint,

the exception of six questions, and fiv£ of these questions did

relate to the other suits listed as references, in the back of the book,
"One

Against

the

Storm,"

Pages

218

through

question related to plaintiff Wadsworth's

221

(ADD

changing

9)

The

sixth

a clients will

and

leaving himself the beneficiary of over half a pillion dollars, entitled
in the matter of the Estate of William L. Orris, deceased Supreme Court
No.

16280.

The

Utah

November 24, 1980.

Supreme

against

Mr.

Wadsworth

on

of the

individual

discovery request of

The Court accepted Mr. Christensen's statement as fact, as

this Court has.

The Court erred in falsely stating appellant's request

dealt with another case.
Manns

ruled

No discussion with the Coujrt ever took place about

relevancy or the immateriality
appellant.

Court

were

involved

There were never any other cases in which the
with

Mr.

Wadsworth

other

than

those

cases

Mr. Christensen, himself, gave as the sources of their charges. (ADD 8)
These cases are the also the same ones Mr. Christensen
Revised

Amended

Mr. Christensen
regarding

Complaint.
claims

are

the very suits he

(ADD.

8)

irrelevant
listed

These
and

in

his

are

immaterial.
complaint

named

in his

same

suits

To claim

this

the

is

"Deceit

and

Collusion" as described in Utah Code 78-51-31 aijid in the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals, Carlucci v. Pip^ Aircraft 775 F 2d 1440
(1985). (ADD. 10)
Appellant did repeatedly ask for the Rights of Discovery, which are
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part of the "Due Process of Law."

It Is an Indisputable fact, verified

by the Record, and appellant properly and timely filed Motions to Compel
under the U. R. C. P. Rule No. 37, which the Court cited, and the record
verifies
knowing

no
he

ruling
had

was

been

ever

denied

made.

Appellant

Discovery

violation of his constitutional

and

went ahead with trial,

Venue

Change

Motions

In

rights, In order to get away from the

bias judicial attitude as that expressed, to the jury, at the opening of
trial, by Judge Fishier R. 499. (ADD 11)
POINT II
The

Court

erred

In

Its

Opinion

when

It

stated,

on

Page

6.

"Defendant claims that plaintiff gave perjured
testimony at trial. We need only respond that the
jury was entrusted to resolve any question of fact
relating to witness credibility"
See Little
America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114
(Utah 1982). Obviously by Its verdict the jury
disagreed with defendant's position."
Opinion, Pg. 6, Paragraph 2
The facts In the case cited are far removed from what happened In the
case of Wadsworth
verdict,

v. Mann

The Courts Statement, "Obviously by Its

the jury disagreed with defendant's

false assumption.

just

two

position,"

Is a

totally

The jury was prevented from seeing the documents which

.perjured Mr Wadsworth 1 s
cite

.

of

statements

many

given

Instances

to the jury.

where

Judge

Appellant

Fishier

Mr. Chrlstensen's objections, In order to hide Mr. Wadsworth's
from the jury.

- 4 -

will

sustained
perjury

(1). Mr. Christensen tried to enhance Mr. Wadsworth's character by
eliciting the statement from Mr. Wadsworth

that he had never had any

disciplinary proceedings against him at the Utah State Bar or elsewhere.
R. 568, (Pg. 70) line 12 through R. 569, (Pq. 71) line 4. (ADD. 12)

When

Mr. Sherlock tried to enter a letter from other attorneys written to the
Utah State Bar which perjured

that testimony, Exhibit

14-D (ADD. 13)

Judge Fishier would not allow it to be entered R. 828. (Pg. 330) (ADD 14).
(2). Attempting

to further

enhance

Mr. Wadsworth's

character

and

credibility with the jury, Mr. Christensen askeq him if he expected any
personal

gain

in obtaining

custody

of

David

for

Mark

Wheeler,

Wadsworth 1 s answer was, quote:
"Absolutely

not.

After

the

Custod^

Matter

was

handled, if I had wanted any of that inoney, I could
have made a petition to the Court for reimbursement of
fees, and

I suppose most any Court wojjld have found

that giving a child back to its natural father or to
its father - - adoptive father, in this case —
justified expenditure.
for

such

fees,

I never made any application

(emphasis

Wheeler to pay my fees.
and

that

became

was a

obvious

added),

I

expected

Mark

When he couldn 't pay my fees
then

I withdrew

from

the

Mr.

The above volunteered
P-79-2 for

which

statement during trial, relates entirely

appellant was refused

discovery.

to

When Mr. Sherlock

attempted to enter Exhibit 13-D (ADD. 16) to prove Mr. Wadsworth has just
perjured

himself

before

the jury, Mr. Christensen objected

Fishier, again, kept from the jury that Wayne Wadsworth

had

and Judge
knowingly

lied under oath to them. R. 661, (Pq. 162), line 6 through R. 662, (Pg.
163), line 7, (ADD. 17)
(ADD. 18)

Also see Page 9, Answer to Interrogatory No. 10.

Mr. Wadsworth, under oath, stated he had filed for attorney's

fees on August 31, 1979.

The Third District Court Records show Wayne

Wadsworth appeared in Court and argued for the payment of this money and
was refused it by Judge Baldwin. (ADD. 19) & (ADD. 20), (Pg. 2) item 4.
These weren't questions Mr. Wadsworth was asked by opposing counsel, but
planned questions by his own attorney to conceal his motives attributed
to him by appellant in his book.

These actions documented by the records

are proof both Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Christensen knowingly objected to
factual proof of perjury being entered in order to win their case.

Mr.

Christensen saw that document and made his own choice between ethics and
subornation of perjury.

The record

doesn't lie.

It was a voluntary

choice of subornation of perjury or obeying the Utah Code and the Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1.

The judge saw these documents also and

the record will show he also chose, likewise, to suppress the proof of
perjury.

Appellant has documentation of numerous lies and perjuries of

Wayne Wadsworth and proof his attorney, Ray Christensen, had in his
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possession documents detailing these felonious acts.

The Facts in the

record show Wayne Wadsworth lacked veracity eveh under oath.
of any rulings or opinions, these facts will not go away.
of perjury of Mr. Wadsworth were
appellant's

Other examples

listed and documented in Point V of

brief and at a minimum each of ijhose examples

misleading the Court.

Regardless

constitute

Other examples of perjuiry and the commission of

vicious criminal acts of Mr. Wadsworth and otfjer members of Watkiss &
Campbell

is detailed

and cited to the Record in Court of Appeals No.

870211-Ca filed February 19, 1988.
POINT III
1. The remaining allegations were that plaintiff
(1) engaged in the bribery of a witness; (2)
deliberately mislead the court;
Opinion, Pg. 1, Footnotes
The

Opinion

statement

that

appellant

hacfl alleged

Mr.

Wadsworth

engaged in the bribery of a witness is false.
Appellant assumes that statement is the one cited and misquoted out
of context from the book R. 160. Paragraph 4 (ADl]>. 21)
"The hearing brought out a number of facts that
appalled me.
First, it seemed [that Sylvi and
Wadsworth had 'bought' the ted timony of an
incompetent doctor whose words simoly aped Sylvi's
and Mark's opinions . . ."
If the Court had referred to the actual quotation in the book in its
entirety on Page 42, (ADD 2 2 ) , they would have found that the word
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"bought" was enclosed in double quotation marks, as shown in Exhibit 12
of appellant's brief.

The use of double quotation marks as used in the

book, with the word "bought" is a common practice to give words special
meanings or connotations. Pg. 1682, #4. (ADD. 23)

Reading Page 42 in

entirety and the 17 pages following this statement, would have clarified
what was being said and how it was being used, and would have dispelled
any

inference of bribery, even

english

punctuation

marks.

though

Any

disqualified from the jury.

jurist

someone
who

was
had

not
read

familiar
the

book

with
was

A prime example of giving special meaning to

words enclosed in double quotation marks is found in Carlucci v. Piper
Aircraft Case 84-5576 wherein Judge Fay states:
"It is my personal observation that too many
practitioner have "Sold out to the client".
Judge Fay, Circuit Judge, 775 Federal Reporter,
2nd Series Pg. 1454. (ADD. 10)
Obviously,

the Honorable

Judge

Fay did

not

suggest

money

changed

hands just for violating statutes or rules in the representation, when he
said "Sold out to the client", no more than I did when I said he "bought"
the testimony of an incompetent doctor, whose words simply aped Sylvi's
and

Mark's

opinion.

The

Court's

propensity

was

to

put

an

different and improper connotation on my statement.
POINT IV
S. Mann, One Against The Storm, pp. 160, 161, 179,
183, 185 (1980).
These statements charge criminal misconduct and a
want of capacity of fitness to practice law, thus
constituting libel per se.
Opinion, Pg 4, Paragraph 3 & 4.
- 8 -

entirely

All

above

Mr. Wadsworth,

referenced
which

pages

occurred

relate

during

to

one

statements

or

actions

or Jnore or the three

of

cases

listed by Mr. Christensen as sources R. 157 through R. 158. (ADD. 8 ) , for
which

appellant

supporting

was

refused

documentation,

discovery.

which

The

statements

had been previously

are

true and

suppressed,

are

a

matter of record in appellant's brief No. 870211-CA filed with the Utah
Court of Appeals on February 19, 1988.

Appellant concurs that statements

charge criminal misconduct and a want of capacity of fitness to practice
law.

Supporting documents consist of the admission by Mr. Wadsworth and

others

at

Watkiss

&

Campbell

that

documents

and

records

have

been

destroyed, a felony, in violation of Utah Code 76-8-510, evidence that
Mr. Christensen

had

documents

in

his

possess ion disputing

statements

which he made in his pleadings in violation of Rule 11, U.R.C.P. & Utah
Code

78-51-31,

Judge

Winder,

Wadsworth

and

that
and

Mr. Wadsworth
documentation

others.

of

deliberatell
numerous

lied to The

acts

of

Honorable

perjury

The Courts Opinion rel ative to this,

appellant to send a copy of Brief 870211-CA, ^nd documentation

of

Mr.

prompted
to the

Salt Lake County Attorney for investigation relative to the commission of
criminal acts. (ADD. 2 4 ) .
CONCLUSION
(1)

The record is indisputable, appellant moved four (4) times to

Compel under Rule 37, U. R. C. P.
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(2)
cases

Wayne Wadsworth committed perjury, in front of the jury, in the
appellant

counsel.

Appellant's

Mr. Wadsworth 1 s
Mr.

cited,

Wadsworth's

when

answering

counselor

perjury.

tried

questions

posed

by

his own

to enter documents which

proved

The documents provided conclusive evidence of

perjury.

However,

after

being

reviewed

by

opposing

counsel and the judge, the documents were withheld from the jury when an
objection was made by counselor for Mr. Wadsworth and objection sustained
by the judge.
(3)

Documents affirm irrefutable evidence of a lack of veracity on

the part of Mr. Wadsworth, which makes suspect Mr. Wadsworth's entire
testimony and makes a mockery of the integrity of the judicial system.
(4)

The appellant

used

verbiage

in his book, with accepted and

proper english punctuation marks, to indicate a word was being used to
express an entirely different meaning than the normal usage of the word.
The

author

neither

thought

or claimed

between Mr. Wadsworth and Dr. Marshall.

that

any money

changed

In Dr. Marshall's

hands

deposition,

Dr. Marshall contributes all of his assumptions and conclusions to Mark
and Silvi Wheeler, which is what the appellant said,
an incompetent doctor which aped Silvi

"the testimony of

& Mark's opinions".

Appellant

•used the same punctuation marks commonly used by authors, the Federal
Judge, teachers, etc., for connotating words used with a special meaning.
("Sold" down the river),

("Bought" the story, hook line and sinker),

("Sold out" to his clients), or ("Bought" the testimony of a doctor).
(5)

The Record is indisputable that appellant was denied discovery

under the rights of "Due Process of Law" as guaranteed by the Fifth
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Amendment and the "Equal Protection Clauses" of the Fourteenth

Amendment

and the Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Sec. 7 a^nd 24.
(6)

Documented facts dispute the Opinion renldered by the Court.

(7)

Discovery will provide proof

of every

statement in the book, if

the Court will not collaborate in suppressing the documents.
Appellant petitions this Court to reconsiderr their Opinion rendered
on February 25, 1988, and grant appellant discoverry and a new trial.
Appellant

hereby certifies that this petition is presented in good

faith and not for delay.

Respectfully submitted this

24th

day of Malrch, 1988.

z?&- u

r7 L.

'<*?

Stanley C. Mann, Pro se.,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I HAND DELIVERED foiir (4) true and correct
copies of the Appellant/Defendant's APPELLANT'S (PETITION FOR REVIEW, this
24th day of March, 1988, to:
Ray R. Christensen Esq.,
Gainer M. Haldbi1lig
Attorneys for Plaintiff & Respondent
Christensen, Jensen, and Powell
510 Clark Learning Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

-rf,-
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ADDENDUMS

R. 48, R. 49, R. 50
R. 61, R. 62
R. 189
R. 195, R. 196, R. 197
R. 254, R. 255
R. 269, R. 270, R. 271, R. 272
R. 287
R. 157, R. 158
Pg. 218 through 221 - One Against Tl^e Storm
Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft, 775 F 2d 1440 (1985 No. 84-5576,
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
R. 498, R. 499
R. 568, through R. 569 (Pages 70 - 71)
Exhibit 14-D
R. 828 (Page 330)
R. 593 (Page 94)
Exhibit 13-D
R. 661, R. 162 (Pages 162 & 163)
Statement made under oath by defendant Wadsworth admitting
he had petitioned the Court for the funds he testified he
had not petitioned for, to the jury. (Add. 15) Pg. 9.
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ADDENDUMS

Objection to Memorandum of Disbursements and Costs P-79-2
(Custody Case) which Mr. Nadsworth prepared and filed with
the Court as Addendum 16.
Order
Taxing
Mr. Wadsworth:

Costs

in

Custody

Case

P-79-2,

which

(1) Filed for Costs. (Add. 16)
(2) Argued over twenty minutes for Costs in court.
(3) Mr. Wadsworth was denied Costs by Court.
(4) Swore, under oath, that he filed for these Costs.
(5) Testified under oath at trial tfjat he had never made any
application for such fees. (Add. 15)
R. 160 Statement from One Against I The Storm out of context
and mi squoted.
Page 42 from One Against The Storm.
Front page Webster's New
Edition and Page 1682,
quotation marks #4.

Word Dictionary, Second College
outlining the usage of double

Letter sent to Salt Lake County attorney, Mr. David Yokum,
March 2, 1988.
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STANLEY C. MANN
3500 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITL 102
P. 0. BOX 27317
SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH
84 1 2 7
TELEPHONE:
(801)
263-1114
In

Propria

Persona
IN THE D I S T R I C T COURT Or THE 'IHIRJL) J U D I C I A L

DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKL COUNTYl, STATE OF UTAH

MOTION TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

H . WAYNE WADSWORTH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
AND SANCTIONS

vs
STANLEY C . MANN; QUEST PUBLISHING
INC.;
A I R TERMINAL G I T T S ; ALBLRTSON'S
INC.;
B . DALTON BOOK SLLLER;
BOBCO'S
S E L F S E R V I C E FOODS; BOBCO•S: B O B ' b
MAGAZINE CORNER; BOOK VAULT; CARR
STATIONERY; D I C K ' S THRirTWAY; GRAND
CENTRAL; HARMON'S, I N C . ; IGA KOMBO;
JORDAN VALLEY BOOKS AND CARDS; L I T T L E
PROFESSOR BOOK CENTER; LOGO'S BOOK
S T O R E ; M A C E Y ' S , I N C . ; REAM'S MARKETS;
SAM W E L L E R ' S BOUNTIFUL BOOK STURE;
SERVUS* DRUG; SKAGGS-ALPHA BETA;
S . M . C . MANAGEMENT CORP; S M I T H ' S
MANAGEMENT CORP; THE BUS S T O P ; THE
MAGAZINE S H O P ; THE WILDFLOWER;
WALDENBOOKS; ZCMI; Z I O N ' S BOOK STORE;
a n d DOES ONE t h r o u g h r i F T Y ,
Defendants,

Civil

No.

C81-8644

r~
-t

' Comes now the defendant and pursuant to the provisions of RuTe 37 asks for the
motion for extension of time be denied, that Lawyer, ^laintiff^a^^h^s counsel be
compelled to provide answers to interrogatories, suppjy documents and that sanctions
be assessed as listed below,
FACT 11 Lawyer, plaintiff H. Wayne Wadsworth and his counsel filed
this case in the Third District Court on November 10, 1931.
FACT #2 Defendant's First Request for Production of Documents and
First Set of Interrogatories to Lawyer, plaintiff, H. Wayne Wadsworth and his
counsel were mailed by certified mail on December 29, 1981. Post Office receipt
shows said documents were delivered to plaintiff on December 30, 1981.
FACT #3 January 15, 1982 Defendant, Stanley C. Mann delivered
answers to the complaint as prescribed by law.

j

FACT #4 Lawyer, plaintiff H. Wayne Wadsworth's answers to interrogatories and production of documents were due on February 1, 1982.
FACT #5 Tuesday, February 2, 1982 defendant received Motion for
Extension of Time from Mr. Ray Christensen post marked Monday February 1, 1982.

043
Paye 1 of 3

FACT #6

If Lawyer, plaintiff and hJLS attorneys did

not have the information requested and tins infoimaLion they would
have needed to substantiate thuii claims at thte time they iiled
this action, their actions w«_re without basis 0f fact, lacking in
merit and the action was filed for an improper cause other than
that which any prudent man would brin \ .
FACT #7

Lawyer, plaintiff is represented by Mr. Ray

R. Christensen and Mr. Dale J. Lambert.
lawyer himself.
m

Plaintiff ib also a

Therefore, even if one attorney has been involved

a lengthly trial it should not warrant an extension ot time

for the Lawyer, plaintiff in answering his interrogatories and
producing documents required by law.
rACT #0

Lawyer, plaintiti's answer to defendant's

counter complaint was due on Thursday, 1ebruar^ 4, 1982.

Mi

Christensen has tiled a motion that the case b(^ dismissed in a
stall and delay strategy without noticing it u^> for a h o n i n g .
rACr ft9 Defendant will file the interrogatories posed
to him at the prescribed time out of lespect febr the law, and
ft
will be at Mr. Ray Christensen's office on Tuesday, 1ebruary 16th
as scheduled for the taking of his deposition cf>ut of respect for
the law, although Mr. Christensen is aware thatf defendant has
been previously scheduled three times to give his deposition on
different matters and it has been cancelled twice.
FACT #10 The plaintiff and his attorney maliciously
filed this case naming the customers which defendant does business
with, knowing there was no justification foi: these charges.

And

as no attempt has been made to serve these customers, it is appaient
this action was brought to hurt the business relationships wlucl
defendant maintains with these customers.

The$e d e l u ^ have in-

creased the damages being suffered by the defendants.
FACT #11

Because of the terroristic^ and malicious

activities by the Lawyer, plaintiff and the stfutegys being
implemented by his counsel, there is very little chance that this
case will ever be settled without going to the jury.
imperative that neither party be allowed to nu|i

It is

a mockery ol

our judicial system through the use of technical chicanery.
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Therefore

1.

(lelcinl.iiil

.isks

lot I In* 1 t> I Inwi m j :

An order to compel the Lawyer, plaintiff to supply

the answers to all of the interrogatories and1 produce the documents
requested no later than February 11th, 1982.
2.

An order to compel the Lawyer, plaintiff to answer

counter claim which was due on February £ 1 198 2 by February 12, 1982.
3.

The following sanctions:
a.

Compensation for sixteen hours of time set

aside for the purpose of studying and analyzing the documents and
answers which was wasted because of plaintiff's failure to comply
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and failure to notify
defendant until after such time as answers were* due.

Compensation

to be at the same hourly wage normally paid t& Lawyer, plaintiff's
attorney.
b.

Plaintiff assessed for the time wasted by

the judge, his entire staff and for the use op the court.

This

money to be placed in a trust fund to be used to increase the
number of judges to improve and speed up the judicial process
and "£o serve as a warning to others who needlessly delay and
obstruct the functioning of our judicial process.
c.

The Lawyer, plaintiff fce assessed $2,000

a day to be put in escrow to cover the costs to the defendants
which will be verified by the defendants at tlpe time of the trial,
and for each delay which occurs from here on <f>ut for not complying with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

NOTICE
TO THE DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL OF RECORD, that the defendant
will call up the foregoing motion on Monday, ^ebruary, 8th, 198 2
at the hour of 2:00 p.m. or as soon as counsel can bo heard.

DATED this 2nd day of February, 1982.
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Tab 2

STANLEY C. MANN
3500 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 102
P. 0. BOX 27317
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
8 4127
TELEPHONE: (801) 263-1114
In Propria Persona
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THII0 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTV STATE OF UTAH

H. WAYNE WADSWORTH,

MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
AND FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiff,
vs
STANLEY C. MANN; QUEST PUBLISHING
INC.; AIR TERMINAL GIFTS; ALBERTSON'S
INC.; B. DALTON BOOK SELLER; BOBCO'S
SELF SERVICE FOODS; BOBCO*S: BOB'S
MAGAZINE CORNER; BOOK VAULT; CARR
STATIONERY; DICK'S THRIFTWAY; GRAND
CENTRAL; HARMON'S, INC.; IGAKOMBO;
JORDAN VALLEY BOOKS AND CARDS; LITTLE
PROFESSOR BOOK CENTER; LOGO'S BOOK
STORE; MACEY'S, INC.; REAM'S MARKETS;
SAM WELLER'S BOUNTIFUL BOOK STORE;
SERVUS DRUG; SKAGGS-ALPHA BETA;
S.M.C. MANAGEMENT CORP; SMITH'S
MANAGEMENT CORP; THE BUS STOP; THE
MAGAZINE SHOP; THE WILDFLOWER;
WALDENBOOKS; ZCMI; ZION'S BOOK STORE;
and DOES ONE through FIFTY,

Civil No. C81-8644

Defendants,

Defendants Stanley C. Mann and Quest Publishing Company
hereby moves the Court, pursuant to the provisions'^^ Rule

r

x

37 (2), (3), (4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for an
jorder compelling-Plaintiff to respond to certain outstanding
discovery requests and for an order awarding Defendants their
costs incurred in bringing this motion.
On December 30, 1981 defendants served uri>on plaintiff,
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff and
Defendant's First Request for Production of Documents.

The

answers to these discovery requests were due or February 1, 1982.
On February 2, 1982 defendants received Motion for Extension of
Time from plaintiff's lawyer, postmarked February 1, 19 82.
On February 2 , 1982 defendants filed a moltion to deny plaintiff's
request for an extension of time and to compel discovery, (defendant
notified plaintiff's counsel this same day.)

0G1
-1-

On February 4, 1982 plaintiff filed a response to Defendants
Request of Interrogatories and Production of {Documents prior to
above motions being heard.
Plaintiff failed to supply answers to Defendant's Interrogatories No. 6 thru No. 50.which are interrogatories all allowable
under U.C.R.P. #26, 33 and 34 referring to scjope of discovery.
Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant)'s Request of Production of Documents requests #1 thru #21, all whp-ch are also allowable
under U.C.R.P #26, 33 and 34.
Defendant refutes plaintiffs general objection (A) under
Response to Interrogatories regarding the defendants characterization of Mark and Silva Wheeler as Family Clients.

The plaintiff

himself characterized this relationship in hip own repeated utterances and unprofessional actions during the suits in which he admits
to representation of Mark and Silvi Wheeler.

Plaintiff refers to

this special family relationship during the course of these suits.
Attachment A. Page 4 0 and 41 of the transcript "Petition to Terminate
Order of Temporary Custody"

Case # P79-2 whi£h came before the

Honorable Judge Bryant H. Croft on Friday, January 12, 1979.
Defendant does not admit to the plaintiff's statement #3,
under Response to Request for Production of Documents
The action of the plaintiff regarding th^ discovery has
necessitated this motion and warrants an awarcj of costs of
defendants bringing this motion.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully requests
answers to Interrogatories No. 6 thru 50 and Request for Product
ion of Documents #1 thru #21 be furnished immediately.

Dated this

9th day of February

, 1982.

Respectfully submitted,

STANLEY^e-. MANN
In Propria Persona

-2-
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Tab 3

ROBERT D. SHERLOCK
Attorney for Defendants
261 East 300 South, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-1300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH,
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO
COMPE^ DISCOVERY

vs.
STANLEY C. MANN, QUEST
PUBLISHING, et. al.,

Civil No. G &/ -

Zta^

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendant S t a n l e y C. Hann, and moves the
Court

for

an O r d e r

Interrogatories
filed

compelling

and Requests

for

Plaintiff

tp

to

Document P r o d u c t i o n

those

previously

herein.
T h i s M o t i o n i s made upon t h e b a s i s

response
hereto,

respond

to s a i d m a t t e r s ,
is

completely

undated,

a copy of

nonresponsive

to

the

that
which

Plaintiff's
is

attached

interrogatories

was not made in good f a i t h , " and the objectionjs

set forth

and

therein

a r e s p u r i o u s and w i t h o u t m e r i t .
This Motion to Compel was p r e v i o u s l y b r o u g h t before

the

Court on February 9, 1982 and was c o n t i n u e d w i t h o u t d a t e .
DATED t h i s

^Cy

day of

id^^C^JT

1982.

ROBERT D. SHERLOCK

Attorney for Defendants
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Tab 4

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake City, Utah
\*

OCT 0 4 1982

Ray R. Christensen
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431

m&poAJ

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

H. WAYNE WADSWORTH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
STANLEY C. MANN, et al.,

Civil No. C-81-8644

Defendants

The plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaim, motion for leave to file a revised amended complaint, and
motion to compel discovery; and defendants' motion to compel
discovery and motion for change of venu^ came regularly on for
hearing before the Hon. Philip R. Fishier, one of the judges
of the above-entitled court, on Tuesdayl, the 7th day of September,
1982, at the hour of 2 o'clock p.m., Ray R. Christen .en, Esq.,
appearing as attorney for the plaintiff); and Robert D. Sherlock,
Esq., appearing as attorney for defendahts; and the Court having
heard the arguments of counsel and havijig examined the memoranda
which they have filed in support of theflLr respective positions,
and being now duly advised in the premises,

19o

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGEp, AND DECREED:
1.

That plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants1

counterclaim is denied; Provided, however, that it is ordered
that the issues of the complaint and is|sues of the counterclaim
be bifurcated, and that the issues of the complaint be tried
first; and further, that in the event that plaintiff prevails on
the complaint, the counterclaim should pe dismissed.
2.

That plaintiff's motion fbr leave to file his

proposed revised amended complaint be a^id the same is hereby
granted.
3.

That plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is

granted, to the following extent:
Defendant is ordered to answer to plaintiff's interrogatories and to respond to plaintiff's request for production of
documents, which were served upon him oh or about the 28th day
of December, 1981, within thirty days from the date hereof;
and in the event of his failure to answer said interrogatories
and respond to the request for production within thirty days,
said defendant's answer and counterclaim shall be stricken
and his default entered.
Plaintiff's motion to compel Stanley C. Mann to answer
the question propounded to him at page 337 of his deposition
is taken under advisement with leave td counsel for the plaintiff
to file a memorandum in support of his position within thirty days
and with leave to counsel for the defendants to file a responsive

IS8

memorandum within five days thereafter.
Plaintiff's motion to compel defendant Mann to answer
the question propounded to him on his deposition at page 380,
line 6, is granted, and defendant Mann is ordered to answer
said question within thirty days from tljie date hereof.
4.

That defendants1 motion tq> compel discovery is

continued to a date when the Court and Counsel can make a
detailed review of the interrogatories ^nd requests for production
to which objections have been filed.
5.

That defendants1 motion for change of venue is

taken under advisement.
DATED this

/v

^

/O^^L /£&(
day of September, 1982.
BY THE COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
is

By
Attorneys for Plaintiff

7

ROBERT D. SHERLOCK
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A*
Attorney for Defendants

Tab 5

STANLEY C. MANN, Pro Se
P. O. Box 27317
Salt Lake City, Utah
84127
Telephone:

(801) 278-9460

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAK)5, STATE OF UTAH

\i. WAYNE WADSWORTH

ANSWER TO OBJECTIONS 1
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FC
ADMISSIONS AND MOTION
COMPEL

Plaintiff
vs

Civil No. C-81-8644
STANLEY C. MANN, QUEST
PUBLISHING, INC. et al..
Defendant
Comes now defendant, Stanley Cj. Mann and states:
1.

Plaintiff H. Wayne Wadswojq th and/or his attorney, Ra]

Christensen made false statements e rlier in this matter to av<

*1

giving direct answers to interrogatories.
2.

(Attachment #1.)

The Requests for Admissions, without exception, are

relevant and material to one of the specific allegations in th
plaintiff Wadsworth's complaint.
3.

Answers to the request for admissions are only unduT

burdensome in that they destroy Mr. Jwadsworth1s suit and expos
as an illegal assassin of characterifor wrongful purposes.

It

not unduly burdomsome for Mr. Wadsworth to make the charges,
therefore, it should not be unduly t>urdonsome to answer questi
pertaining to those charges.

254

-24.

If the plaintiff and his attorney are acting in good

faith, answers to the questions (they acknowledge are relevant)
should be answered.
5.

The requests are not vague and 4mbiguous if innocent of

the actions related to the requests.

According to Mr. Wadsworth,

"Any innocent man would jump at the opportunity to clear his name."
6.

The only repetitious request woitild be where Mr. Wadsworth

was guilty, of more than one action, relating to statements of his
activities, made in the book "One Against The Storm".
7.

For the plaintiff, Wadsworth and his attorney, Ray R.

Christensen to object on the basis of requests being "so voluminous
and by their sheer number they amount to harassment and annoyance of
Plaintiff" is ludicrus and not acting in jjood faith.

The Plaintiff,

Wadsworth, and his attorney, Ray R. Christensen, filed this suit, fo
a malicious and wrongful purpose.

They voluminously compiled a list

of stores who had sold the book, "One Against the Storm" and then
wrote a letter and threatened these contractual customers, which
resulted in the destruction of two companlies.

(Attachment #2).

I respectfully request that Plaintilff Wadsworth be compelled
to answer the "Request for Admissions" immediately.

That the

expenses to defendant be awarded for this intentional bad faith
action on the part of Plaintiff Wadsworth) and his Attorney, Ray R.
Christensen according to Rule 37(4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Tab 6

STANLEY C. MANN, Pro Se
P. O. Box 27317
Salt Lake City, Utah 84127
Telephone:

(801) 278-9460
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

H. WAYNE WADSWORTH
Plaintiff

CpLVil C-81-8644

vs
STANLEY C. MANN, QUEST
PUBLISHING, INC., WESTERN
MARKETING RESOURCES, INC., ET AL.,
Defendant's

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about the 10th day of November 1981, Plaintiff
Wadsworth caused to be initiated in the Thijjrd Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, a Civil Action entitled H. Wayne
Wadsworth vs Stanley C. Mann; Quest Publishing, Inc; Air terminal
Gifts; Albertson's Inc; B. Dalton Book Seller; Bobco's Self Service
Foods; Bobco's; Bob's Magazine Corner; Book Vault; Carr Stationary;
Dick's Thriftway; Grand Central; Harmon's inc.; I.G.A. Kombo; Jordan
Valley Books and Cards; Little Professor Book Center; Logos Book
Store; Macey's Inc.' Reams Markets; Sam Weller's Bountiful Book
Store; Servus Drug; Skaggs-Alpha Beta; S.M.C. Management Corp.; The
Bus Stop; The Managzine Shop; The Wildflower; Waldenbooks; Z.C.M.I;
Zions Book Store; and Does One through Fifty), Defendants.

269

-2That said action seeks both legal and equitable relief
against Defendant, Defendant's publishers ahd contractual customers,
(various book stores, retail chains and outlet) in connection with
the publication and distribution of a book authored by Defendant and
entitled "One Against the Storm", which bool^ contains critical
accounts of certain conduct of Plaintiff Waasworth and others in
connection with the custody and trust of on£ David Wheeler, a minor
grand-nephew of Defendant and actions of Waasworth in a suit filed
for a Family Client for which he was found (jjuilty of malicious
prosecution and assessed punitive damages by the jury, in addition
to general damages. (See attachment #1.)
The plaintiff Wadsworth did not at the time of filing of
said complaint, or at any time thereafter skve any of the book
stores, retail chains or outlets named in tfre action, with the
exception of Quest Publishing Inc., and Western Marketing Resources,
Inc.,

The Plaintiff has since dismissed all defendants from their

action except Stanley C. Mann, Quest Publishing Inc., and Western
Marketing Resources, Inc., (both companies are entities
predominately owned by Stanley C. Mann and/dr his family.
That subsequent to the filing of s&id Amended Complaint,
said Plaintiff caused to be circulated to a^Ll those named but
unserved Defendants' a letter subscribed by Ray R. Christensen, said
Plaintiffs counsel.

By the terms of that letter the agreement of

each named book store, chain and retail outlet to permanently
refrain from stocking or selling the subject publication was
solicited, regardless of the outcome of the suit, in return for said

270

-3Plaintiffs agreement not to serve the Complaint or seek further
relief.
That at the time of filing of said Complaint, said Plaintiff
did not intend to serve, and in fact instructed their counsel not to
serve, the numerous named book stores, retail chains and outlets
which had undertaken, or agreed to undertake the sale and distribution of Defendant's book, "One Against the Storm".
Plaintiff's and his counsel, Ray R+ Christensen's
objections to the Request for Admissions is completely non responsive
and was not made in good faith.
totally without merit.

The objections are spurious and

The objections aretiretextualinasmuch as;

Plaintiff is aware that admissions, made in his personal
testimony given under oath, convicts him of actions Plaintiff claimed
were libelous and had sought relief for in his complaint.

Plaintiff

is also aware that denials of the same would constitute perjury on
the part of the Plaintiff.

Counselor's role as an advocate does not

include knowingly making false claims for a client.

Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure #11.
The actions of Plaintiff, Wadsworth and/or his counsel, Ray
R. Christensen in illegally communicating with Defendant Mann's
contractual customers, making intimidating threats, and pressuring
them to reframe from exercising their constitutional rights, was
extortion and these actions had an adverse detrimental effect on the
relationship enjoyed between Defendant Mann and his contractual
customers, which resulted in the insolvency of Western Marketing
Resources, Inc., Quest Publishing Inc., and Stanley C. Mann.

27 i

-4Defendant's constitutional and Statutory Rights of Discovery
have been denied in spite of numerous requests and the -expenditure of
thousands of dollars.

Defendant has been denied the rights necessary

to defend himself, although these rights haye been granted to the
Plaintiff and complied with by the Defendant^..
All interrogatories propounded to Plaintiff relate to the
defense against Plaintiff's complaint.

The same is true of requests

for documents and the Request for Admission^.

Plaintiff, who

brought this action over two (2) years and three (3) months agor
still refuses to answer interrogatories or supply documents.
The Plaintiff has done nothing to move this action towards
trial.

The deposition of Defendant, Stanlejy C. Mann was taken in

February of 1982, a request by Plaintiff ma^3e for answers to
interrogatories and request for documents which was complied with on
October 18, 1982.
Plaintiff has refused Defendant any discovery and supplied
blatantly false statements to the court to justify his conduct.
The allegations in the publication "One Against the Storm"
are entirely true.

The Plaintiff and his qounsel both know this and

have purposely profaned the legal and judicial process and failed to
prosecute their complaint.
The Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for this
reason so that counterclaims can be prosecuted.

DATED THIS 3ft *--

day of (T/7/? /J*A'//

1984.
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Tab 8

to the provisions of Rule 9 (a) (2)., - Ul.R.C.P. , reserves the righ
to designate and serve said defendant^ by their correct names and
to set forth their conduct relating to the Book when such information becomes known,
6.

Plaintiff

represented

one Mark

W. Wheeler

in ar

action against defendant Mann and hi^ wife to obtain the custody
of Wheeler's son, David Mark Wheeler, after the death of the
i

child's mother, Joan Wheeler, entitled "In the Matter of: Davie
District Court of Salt Lak(
Mark Newton Wheeler, a Minor" in the
County, State of Utah, Probate No. 79-2

(hereinafter "Custody

Action") during the period of approximately January 1, 1979 t<
March 11, 1980.

Plaintiff represented Mark W. Wheeler in a lega

action against defendant Mann to remote him as trustee of certai
insurance funds and other property belonging to the minor, Davi
Mark Wheeler, of which Mann had taken possession following th
death of Joan Wheeler, in favor of a corporate trustee or alter
natively, to require an accounting and bonding of the defendan
Mann, should he be retained as trustee, in an action entitled
"David Mark Newton Wheeler, a Minor) Child, by and through hi
Guardian Ad Litem, Mark Wayne Wheelejr, Plaintiff, versus Stanle
C. Mann, Defendant" in the District Court of Salt Lake County
State of Utah, Civil No. C-79-4063 '(hereinafter "Trust Action"
during the period of approximately Ji4ne 22, 1979 to May 16, 198C
Also, plaintiff Wadsworth represented Mark W. Wheeler and hi
- 3 / y /

157

wife, Sylvi Wheeler, in a legal actioi) against defendant Mann and
I
his wife for interference with Mr. [Wheelerfs parental custody
rights to David Mark Wheeler and for, damages resulting from th€
Manns1 alleged involvement in a shooting of Mark W. Wheeler in ar
action entitled:

"Mark W. Wheeler ancp Sylvi Wheeler, Plaintiffs/

vs. Stanley C. Mann and Louise C. Mann, Defendants", in the
United States District Court for th^ District of Utah, Centra.
Division, No. C-79-0772W, (hereinaft4r "Tort Action") during th<
i

period of approximately December 28, 1979 to May 21, 1980.
7.

The

Book

refers

to certain

family

relationship;

existing between and among defendant Mann, Joan Wheeler, and he
sister Shaunna Young, and other members and relatives of the Man
family and to the legal actions above-mentioned.

The Book wa

first published by placing it for sal^e in the State of Utah on o
about the 26th day of November, 1980.,
8.

The Book, published

ir} paperback

form, contains

inter alia, the following notations cj>n the back cover:
The facade of respectability of professional
people - legal, judicial, political and religious - BARED.
Her death brought such bizarre and incredible
circumstances as to bogle (sic) the human
mind. This could happen tolanyone.
They were victims of
chauvinistic judges.

le^al

brutality

and

The Author's Note contains the folloying statements:

M
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Tab 9

Divorce Case # N W D 58814. Superior Court of California,
County of Los Angeles. Joan N . Wheeler, Petitioner Vs Mark
W a y n e Wheeler, Respondent. January 7, 1976.
Deposition of Joan Wheeler. San Diego, California, August
21, 1976. Joan N. W h e e l e r Vs M a r k W a y n e Wheeler N W D
58814.
Deposition of M a r k W a y n e Wheeler, San Diego, California,
August 21, 1976. Joan N. W h e e l e r Vs M a r k W a y n e Wheeler
N W D 58814.

References
Complaint dated N o v e m b e r 28,1975, Complaint 234178, Civil
21241. Plaintiff-Charles William Newton Vs D e f e n d a n t Shauna N. Young. District Court of Davis County, Utah. Later
moved to Salt Lake County by David Young.
2nd Codicil to the will of Charles W. Newton, dated 2nd
August, 1975.
Abstract of Judgment. Superior Court of California, County
of Los Angeles. Joan N. Wheeler, Plaintiff Vs M a r k W a y n e
Wheeler. D e c e m b e r 18, 1978.
Examination of Judgment. Debtor Mark W a y n e Wheeler,
Van Nuys, California. March 1,1979. Estate of Joan N. W h e e l er Vs M a r k W a y n e W h e e l e r N W D 58814.
Decree of Adoption # A D 89908. Superior Court of California, C o u n t y of Los Angeles. December 19, 1975.

Deposition of M a r k W a y n e Wheeler. Salt Lake City, Utah.
June 20,1979. Matter, David Mark Newton Wheeler, A Minor,
Probate P-79-2.
Deposition of Sylvi Wheeler, Beverly Hills, California. O c t o ber 10, 1977. Dick Robinson.Vs Mel H a r d m a n Productions.
# 2 1 8 7 0 9 (Civil).
Deposition, Raylan Jensen, Salt Lake City. November 29,
1976 & April 14, 1977. Dick Robinson Vs Mel H a r d m a n Productions. Civil 218709.
Deposition of Robert H. Marshall, M . D . Encino, California.
June 28,1979. Matter, David M a r k Newton Wheeler, A Minor.
P-79-2.
Deposition of William Richard Treu, Encino, California. June
28, 1979. Matter, David M a r k Newton Wheeler, A Minor.
P-79-2.
Deposition of N o r m a A n n W a l d m a n , Encino, California. June
28, 1979. Matter, David M a r k Newton Wheeler, A Minor.
P-79-2.

Deposition of Keith R. Haight, Encino, California. June 28,
1979. Matter, David Mark Newton Wheeler, A Minor. P-79-2.
Petition to Terminate Order of Temporary Guardianship. Salt
Lake City, Utah. January 12, 1979. Matter, David Mark Newton Wheeler, A Minor. P-79-2. Judge: Bryant Croft.
Petition to Terminate Guardianship and Order that Minor Be
Delivered to Father. Salt Lake City, Utah. January 4, 1979.
Matter, David Mark Newton Wheeler, A Minor P-79-2. Judge:
Bryant Croft.
Transcript of Proceedings in the Matter of David Mark
Wheeler. July 23, 1979. Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Utah.
National Transportation Safety Board Report #NTSB-AAR—
79-7. June 7, 1979. Titled, Aircraft Accident Report—United
Airlines Inc. McDonnel-Douglas DC-8-61, N 8082U. Portland, Oregon. December 28, 1978.

Deposition of Sylvi Wheeler, Salt Lake City, Utah, March 13,
1980 in the matter of Mark and Sylvi Wheeler Vs Stanley and
Louise Mann. Civil #C-79-0772 W.
Transcript of motion for summary judgement on Louise S.
Mann. U.S. District Court of Utah. Civil # C-79-0772 W. May
21, 1980.
Transcript of motion to withdraw as counsel for the plaintiffs
by Wayne Wadsworth. U.S. District Court of Utah. Civil
# C-79-0772 W. May 21, 1980.
Affidavit of Stephen A. Trost # C-79-0772 W. U.S. District
Court of Utah. July 7, 1980.
Letter to The Honorable David K. Winder. United States
District Court Judge. July 14, 1980. Raymond J. Etcheverry.
# C-79-0772 W.

Personal History of Joan Newton Wheeler. 1942-1978

Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. Mark W. Wheeler and
Sylvi Wheeler Vs Stanley C. Mann and Louise S. Mann. U.S.
District Court of Utah. #C-79-0772 W. July 18, 1980.

Diary, Notes, Letters, and Tapes by/to Joan Newton Wheeler.
1966-1978.

Plaintiffs Order to Show Cause. Third Judicial District Court.
Salt Lake County. August 29, 1980. #C-79-4063.

Letters, Tapes, and Notes by Mark Wayne Wheeler. 19661975.
Letters from Wayne Wadsworth to Paul Liapis and Byron
Fisher.
Deposition of Mark Wayne Wheeler, Salt Lake City, Utah,
March 12, 1980 in matter of Mark and Sylvi Wheeler Vs
Stanley and Louise Mann. Civil #C-79-0772 W.
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HOOKS APPENDIX—Continued
persons trained m the law Id at 828, 97
S Ct at 1498
On October 6 1977, the district court
granted the plaintiff interveners' applica
tion for preliminary injunctive relief Af
ter considering the State's proposed law
library plan and expressing doubts as to its
sufficiency, the district court preliminarily
enjoined the State from permitting termi
nation of the Pnson Project until final approval of a plan that would meet the
State s constitutional duty The Fifth Cir
cuit affirmed the district court's order
granting the preliminary injunction, Hooks
v Wainumght, 578 F 2d 1102, 1103 (5th
Cir 1978), which remains m effect
See
Hooks v Wainumght, 536 F S u p p at 1355
The district court conducted an evidentia
ry hearing in July \97S and again took the
matter under advisement
For the next
three years, the district court held status
conferences and encouraged the parties to
reach an appropriate settlement
During
this period, the Florida Legislature con
sidered enabling legislation that would
have sanctioned a proposed plan under
which state public defenders would have
assisted indigent inmates m post-conviction
and parole revocation proceedings and in
actions challenging conditions of confine
m e n t After the legislation died m commit
tee in 1981^Jthe^ailie8^^me4a4e4^hat^ttr^
ther settlement negotiations were futile
and requested the district court to enter an
appealable order concerning the question
of whether the assistance of attorneys, in
some form, was an essential ingredient of
Florida's attempt to comply with the man
date of Bounds v Smith that inmates be
afforded meaningful access to the courts

Clara CARLUCCI, individually and as
Special Administrator of the Estate of
Carlucci, Alberto, Deceased, Plaintiff,
P I P E R AIRCRAFT CORP., I N C , a
c o r p , Defendant,
F r a n c i s A Anania, Appellant
No. 84-5576
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit
Nov 12, 1985

Attorney found to have acted in bad
faith during discovery in wrongful death
action was fined $10,000 under Civil Rule
37 by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, James C
Paine, J , and he appealed The Court of
Appeals, Johnson, Circuit Judge, held t h a t
(1) evidence supported imposition of sane
tion, (2) show cause order constituted adequate notice, and (3) order imposing $10,
000 fine was deficient for failing to detail
basis for arriving at that sum
]
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded
Fay, Circuit Judge, f i l e d ^ concurring
^pihlbh

1. Federal Civil Procedure fc=»1278
All federal courts have power, by statute, by rule, and by common law, to impose
sanctions against recalcitrant lawyers and
parties litigant 28 U S C A § 1927, Fed
Rules Civ Proc Rule 37(b), (b)(2), 28 U S
CA
2 Federal Courts «=>820. 870
Standard of review for appellate court
in considering appeal of sanctions under
Civil Rule 37 is sharply limited to search
for abuse of discretion and determination
that findings of trial court are fully supported by the record Fed Rules Civ Proc
Rule 37, 28 U S C A

3 Attorney and Client «=>24
Imposing sanctions under Civil Rule 37
on attorney for defendant in wrongful
death action was supported by sufficient
evidence that attorney had wrongfully ter
minatcd discovery production sessions and
made conflicting representations to the
court as to existence of investigative reports prepared by his client
Fed Rules
Civ Proc Rule 37, 28 U S C A
4. Federal Civil Procedure «=»1366
Motion for relief from being required
to give deposition- cannot be filed when
parties are under direct order to continue
deposition until completed Fed Rules Civ
Proc Rule 30(d), 28 U.S C A
5. Attorney and Client *=24
I>ocal court rule governing proceedings
against attorneys for misconduct was inapplicable to attorney against whom sanctions under Civil Rule 37 were proposed to
be imposed for his having acted in bad
faith during discovery
Fed Rules Civ
Proc Rule 37, 28 U S C A , U S D i s t C t
Rules S D Fla , Disciplinary Rule 5
6 Attorney and Client «=>24
Sanctions under Civil Rule 37 could be
imposed on attorney found to have acted m
bad faith during discovery even though
underlying suit had been settled
Fed
Rules Civ Proc Rule 37, 28 U S C A
JT^JUtorney^am^Chent «=>24^
Order to show cause why sanctions or
disciplinary actions should not be imposed
on attorney found to have acted in bad
faith during discovery was adequate to apprise attorney that only issue of sanctions
was to be considered, despite contention
that order did not inform attorney of all
discovery conduct for which he would be
called upon to answer, where relevant find
mgs of bad faith conduct alleged against
him had already been made, before order to
show cause was issued, during course of
discovery at tune when ample opportunity
was afforded for attorney to be heard on
factual matters being considered
Fed
Rules Civ Proc Rule 37, 28 U S C A
* Honorable Walter E Hoffman U S District
Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia sitting
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8 Attorney and Client «=24
Imposition of $10,000 fine on attorney
found to have acted in bad faith during
discovery was deficient in that trial court
failed to detail basis for arriving at that
sum Fed Rules Civ Proc Rules 37, 37(b),
28 U S C A
9 Federal Civil Procedure «=1278
Magnitude of sanctions awarded is
bounded under Civil Rule 37 only by that
which is reasonable m light of the circum
stances
Fed Rules Civ Proc Rule 37, 28
USCA
10 Federal Civil Procedure «=1278
Permissible purposes of sanction under
Civil Rule 37 include compensating cou*t
and other parties for added expense caused
by abuBive conduct, compelling discovery,
deterring others from engaging in similar
conduct, and penalizing guilty party or at
torney
Fed Rules Civ Proc Rule 37, 28
USOA
11 Federal Civil Procedure «=»1278
In cases invoking sanction power of
Cml Rule 37, district court must clearly
state its reasons so that meaningful review
may be had on appeal Fed Rules Civ Proc
Rule 37, 28 U S C A

-BJaekweW, Walker, ^ r a y . ^ P o w e T s r ^ h c l r ^
& Hoehl James E Tnbble, Miami, Fla , for
appellant
Joseph W Womack, Miami Fla , A Ward
Wagner, Mark Clark, Richard A Kupfer,
West Palm Beach, F l a , for plaintiff
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida
Before FAY and JOHNSON
Circuit
Judges, and HOFFMAN *, District Judge
JOHNSON, Circuit Judge
Appellant Francis A Anania was attor
ney for the defendant, Piper Airlines, in
this consolidated wrongful death action,
by designation
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and was found by the court below to have
acted in bad faith by inter alia, unilaterally terminating document production sessions ordered by the court and making
conflicting representations as to the existence of certain documents The district
court gave Mr Anania repeated warnings
that his conduct was unacceptable and held
out the possible imposition of sanctions in
an attempt to secure his cooperation in the
discovery process, but to no avail Following settlement and entry of judgment for
the plaintiff Carlucci on the claim underlying, the trial court issued a show cause
order directing Anania to appear at a hearing to determine whether disciplinary action or sanctions should be imposed under
Fed R Civ P 37 After holding the hearing
and considering affidavits submitted on his
behalf, the district court entered an order
assessing Anania a $10,000 fine
On appeal Anania presents us with four
issues He argues 1) that the procedure
followed by the court below imposing sane
tions was in violation of the Local Rules of
Disciplinary Enforcement enacted by the
District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, 2) that the imposition of sanctions
was in violation of Anania's due process
rights as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 3)
that the findings of misconduct by the
court below were not supported by legally
j^fficjejit^ejvideric^r^n44Hhat^he amounT
of the sanction imposed was not supported
by the record and was grossly excessive
We find that as to issues 1), 2) and 3)
there is no merit and we AFFIRM, as to
issue 4) we must REVERSE AND REMAND solely to require the district court
to provide support for the amount of fine
or cost imposed as required by Fed.R.Civ P
37
I. Facts
The facts that gave rise to this appeal
are convoluted, constituting almost 2600
pages of record contained in twenty volumes They accordingly must be set out at
some length.
The initial pleadings in this case were
filed in December of 1978 The subject of

the lawsuit was the 1976 crash, in Ireland,
of a plane manufactured by the defendant
Piper Aircraft In September of 1981
Clara Carlucci, representing the estate of
her husband Alberto, a victim of the crash,
filed requests for the production of a variety of documents in Piper's possession relating to the controversy Piper, through
Anania, objected to this request on several
grounds, arguing that the documents were
privileged and that production would impose an excessive burden Carlucci filed a
motion to compel discovery, and both sides
submitted briefs on the issues to the district court On December 31, 1981, the
court, James C Paine, J, entered an order
listing categories of documents that were
appropriate for production Included were
Piper's investigative reports Those for ac
cidents that occurred after the 1976 Ireland
crash were expressly exempted -from discovery
Subsequent disputes between counsel impeded the production of any documents under the December 1981 order and required
a hearing before Judge Paine on May 18,
1982 At that hearing, Anania was asked
whether Piper, his client, had produced the
requested accident reports. Anania replied

Your Honor, I haven't produced any of
the documents, because I was told such
production would be unacceptablej^and
yoiiriTOnor77Psee no practical reason to
proceed with the compilation of all these
documents if at some future time the
plaintiff was going to reject it, and your
honor was going to say go back and do it
all over again
At the end of the hearing, the court
ordered Piper to produce the documents
previously listed in the December 1981 oi%
der Carlucci's counsel suggested meeting^
at Piper's plant in Lock Haven, Pennsylva-.
ma, to examine the originals of the doc-^
uments and make copies of those needed^
Piper agreed The court instructed Carluc^
ci's counsel to draft a proposed order cody
taming the substancei <of the court's mstrugj
tions to the parties at the hearing. ThW
was done on June 2, with Piper submitting?
a letter on June 6 opposing the requirtg
ment that it produce the originals. Piggl
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proposed to produce copies, and to make
originals available for inspection if the copies were illegible The district court's order was signed on June 11, it required the
production of originals Production was to
begin on June 14 and to continue "until the
production set forth herein is completed "
Lock Haven
Anania claims not to have received the
court's order until the morning of June 14,
the day in which discovery was to begin
Copies of the requested documents had
been assembled during the previous week,
but the originals were scattered throughout various offices at the Lock Haven
plant, Anania claimed Piper was too short
of manpower to devote additional personnel
to the task of recollecting all of the onginal
documents He offered to produce originals for copies which were not legible, but
Carlucci was unsatisfied
Attempts to
reach Judge Paine telephonically failed,
leading Anania to contact Judge Malcolm
Muir of the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
Judge Muir agreed to resolve the dispute if
Carlucci filed a written motion and brief
and if Piper filed a reply brief within three
days Carlucci did not pursue this course
Anania terminated the Lock Haven discovery session after only one day of pro^hrctioinmo^oT document marking by returning to Miami without explanation He
now argues that he terminated the produc
tion session because he had underestimated
the time necessary for production and had
conflicting commitments in Miami He fur
ther argues that Carlucci suffered no prej
udice as a result of receiving copies at the
Lock Haven session, since none were challenged on authenticity grounds when the
originals were finally produced at later discovery sessions in Chicago and West Palm
Beach
Based on the difficulties encountered at
the Lock Haven session, Carlucci filed her
first motion to impose sanctions and to
strike Piper's answer Piper filed a re
quest for a hearing and for a status confer'•

Judge Campbell designated to sit in the South
ern District of Florida was acting on behalf of
Jucjge Paine in the latter s absence
Subse
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ence No hearing was held, but a tran
script of the Lock Haven session and bnefs
from both parties were considered by the
court On November 17, 1983, Judge Paine
entered an order finding that both Piper
and Anania had acted in bad faith in failing
to comply with the June 11, 1982 discovery
order
Defendant's counsel
shares, in large
measure, the blame for noncompliance
with this Court's order, for it was he who
oversaw the proceedings in Lock Haven
His conduct dunng that session deviated
from what could be characterized as le
gitimate and vigorous representation of
one's client He was uncooperative, verbally abusive to Plaintiffs' counsel, and
obstructive, effectively thwarting the dis
covery demanded by Court order This
Court finds that he acted in bad faith •
This order referred specifically to Anania's
response to Judge Paine on May 18, 1982,
concerning production of Piper's accident
investigation reports, stating that Piper
had not produced "any of the documents "
The court found this response to be in
conflict with a subsequent representation
that no such reports existed, for the pnor
representation was taken to imply that the
documents did in fact exist
The court ordered sanctions imposed on
Piper, including the completion of produc
tion of original documents at a time and
place convenient to Carlucci's counsel A
ruling on sanctions against Anania, as distinct from Piper, was expressly reserved,
"pending Plaintiffs' submission of ex
penses, including attorneys' fees, incurred
as a direct result of the Lock Haven pro
ceedmgs of June 14th and June 15th, 1982 "
Carlucci did not file an accounting of these
expenses
Piper filed three separate motions in re
sponse to Judge Paine's order (1) A mo
tion for rehearing was filed on November
28 This motion was denied by Judge Wil
ham J Campbell, Senior United States
Judge for the Northern District of Illinois '
quently Judge Campbell was desigmted by
Judge Paine to hear all matters related to this
controversy pending and future
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(2) A motion for reconsideration was filed
on November 30 It too was denied for
failure to specify any factual e r ror Judge
Campbell reviewed the Lock Haven tran
script and concluded that Judge Paine's
findings were correct, he characterized the
motion for reconsideration as a "delaying
t a c t i c " (3) An emergency motion for a
stay, filed December 1, was heard and de
nied by Judge Campbell This Court af
firmed Judge Campbell's denial on appeal
in an order entered on December 5, 1983
Chicago
A second production session begin in
Chicago on December 5, 1981 It continued
for ten davs, though not without dispute
The parties filed several motions with
Judge Campbell, who ruled on them
promptly On December 16, another hear
mg was held before Judge Prentice H Mar
shall of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois on Piper's
motion to quash various subpoenas The
motion was granted and according to Ana
ma, the court directed that future dis
covery disputes should be resolved in the
District Court in Florida The court below
charactemed this venue ruling as simply a
"suggestion ' and further noted that Judge
Marshall continued the heanng until December 21
On December 21 AjiajuAiaileiiio-appeaF
-b^fore^Tudge Marshall He had apparently
returned to Florida following the December
16 heanng, leaving Carluccfs attorneys,
their expert witness, paralegals, and the
court reporter waiting in Carlucci's attor
ney's law office for discovery to resume
On December 19 Piper had filed in the
Southern District of Florida a motion for a
protective order pursuant to Fed R Civ P
30(d) 2 claiming that a deponent, Mr Reeder, was being harassed by Carlucci's lawyer to the detriment of the deponent's
2

Rule 30(d) provides in relevant part
At any time during the taking of a deposition
on motion of i party or of the deponent and
upon a showing that the examimtion is being
conducted in bad faith or m such manner as
unreasonably to annoy embarrass or oppress
the deponent or party the court
may
order the officer conducting the examination
to cease forthwith from taking the examina

health Anania now further asserts that
both he and the deponent were "the target
of abusive comments and threats of arrest
and even extradition "
Carlucci learned via telegram sent on
December 19 that the document production
session had been terminated pursuant to
Rule 30(d) In the telegram, Piper again
offered to produce copies of the documents
already assembled
Carlucci's response
was to file a second motion to strike Piper's
answer
On December 28, 1981, a pretrial confer
ence was held before Judge Campbell Piper's Rule 30(d) motion was denied A nil
mg on Carlucci's motion to strike was deferred And the court found that Anania
had improperly terminated the Chicago production session Regarding sanctions, the
court stated
Now, as to sanctions, full authority in
that has been invested in me, and I will
impose the sanctions outlined by Judge
Paine as to costs and fees arising out of
the Pennsylvania ill fated production session
However, I will reserve finding on
those until after we dispose of all discovery and maybe until after t h e ^ a s e ^
The deTendaiits have already been
found in bad faith by Judge Paine
Naturally that calls for sanctions
When I consider that matter, I will consider your conduct from here hence forward, and advise defense counsel, who
has already been held in bad faith, that
[he] may purge [himself] of the necessity
}
for further sanctions
I'll decide that when I see how you
cooperate in the discovery process from
now on
tion
Upon demand of the objecting party
or deponent the taking of the deposition shall
be suspended for the time necessary to make
a motion for an order
The provisions of
Rule 34(a) [losing party in motion to compel
discovery must pay prevailing p i r t y s attor^
neys fees and expenses connected with mo-,
tionl apply to the a w i r d of expenses incurred %
in relation to the motion

West Palm

Beach

Judge Campbell appointed a retired Flor
ida state judge, James R Knott, as special
master to oversee the completion of dis
covery in West Palm Beach
Document
production resumed before Judge Knott on
January 4, 1984
On the first day, Mr
Reeder testified that he had still not in
quired of Piper s other employees (one of
whom had travelled to Ireland to assist the
Irish government in making its official re
port on this accident) whether they pos
sessed documents falling within Carlucci s
request Further disputes ciused produc
tion to cease on January 10, after which
Carlucci filed a third motion to strike

accident investigation
reports and con
eluded that Anania either had not in
quired of Piper as to the existence of such
reports bejore objecting to Carlucci s re
quest for production in the first
instance
or had deliberately misled Judge Paine at
the May 18 heanng for his reply then
had implied that such documents did ex
ist According to the court, either uould
support 'the imposition
of more severe
sanctions " The order further
criticized
Anania
for making
'false" and "con
temptuous"
representations
to the court
concerning
Piper's repeated failure
to
produce the Bressler documents
These
representations
uere to the ejfect that
Piper uas not required to produce
the
documents
and in any event,
Carlucci
could obtain ansuers to her
interrogato
nes from other sources

At a hearing before Judge Knott on Jan
uary 27, an issue arose as to the production
of investigative reports called the "Bres
sler documents" concerning an accident
that occurred after the 1976 Ireland crash
Piper then settled the remaining issue of
Piper argued that the Bressler documents d images in the underlying lawsuit At a
were not discoverable under the order hearing before Judge Paine on April 10 the
Judge Paine had entered on December 31
settlement was entered as a final judgment
1981, but stated that it was prepared to
in the amount of $3 800,000 Anania s law
produce the documents if required to do so
partner then requested the court to retain
Judge Knott ordered that the documents be
jurisdiction so that Anania could present
produced by February 6 On February 7,
evidence concerning the adverse findings
Piper appealed Judge Knott's order to the
district court, which court dismissed the as to his conduct made during the dis
a£peaI-as-ir4volous—The^forjurrieTTt^lvel^ ^e<>v^ry^ttxnreedTrigs JudgeTTaine respond
ed that this matter would remain open af
eventually produced in piecemeal fashion
ter final judgment and he noted
On March 7, J u d g e Knott filed a report
It does seem to me it is fair to have some
detailing problems with Anania and noting
sort of a heanng and an opportunity for
Piper's "indifference" in lesponding to pro
[Anania] to explain
I regard it as a
duction requests Anania filed an affidavit
pretty serious matter, and there, hopeful
disputing Judge Knott s account on March
ly, are explanations that will at least
23
Another hearing u a s held before
mitigate the situation to some extent
Judge Campbell and briefs were filed by
On April 26, Judges Pame and Campbell
the parties
*
entered an order to show cause why sane
On March 30, 1984, Judge Campbell en
tions or disciplinary action should not be
tered an order granting Carlucci's motion
imposed on Anania The show cause order
to strike and found liability on the part of
specifically referred to the November 17
Piper Carlucci v Piper Aircraft
Corp,
Inc, 102 FRD 472 (SD Fla 1984) (Mem) 1983 and March 30, 1984 orders of the
He premised his order on findings
that court finding Anania to have acted in bad
Anania filed a motion m response
Piper had deliberately destroyed
certain faith
arguing that the show cause order had not
documents and along with Anania
had
engaged in conduct designed to obstruct informed him of the specific conduct under
review and thus denied him procedural due
the discovery piocess
Ihe order refer
enced Anania s ansuer to Judge
Paine's process under the Fifth Amendment Fur
question of May 18, 1982, concerning
the ther, assuming formal charges would be
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filed, Anania requested that they he heard
hy a district judge who had not previously
been involved in the underlying lawsuit
Anania testified at a hearing before
Judges Paine and Campbell on May 4 and
submitted additional evidence by way of
affidavits. His testimony comprised an attempt to explain his prior conduct as acceptable under the circumstances, which he
alleged included comparable conduct on the
part of Carlucci's attorney. He requested
that the court remove fiom its prior orders
the references to his conduct as having
been in bad faith.
Following the hearing, Anania filed a
motion lo vacate the show cause order and
limit the purpose of the hearing that had
aheady been held
Ho alleged that the
show cause order had not been entered in
accordance with Ride 5 of the IiOC.il Rules
of Disciplinary Enforcement for the South
ern District of Florida
He also restated
the procedural duo process claims previously asserted in his response to the show
causo order. Both parties filed briefs addressing these and other issues.
On .lime 28, 1981, Judges Paine and
Campbell entered an order rejecting both
Anania's procedural due process claims and
the applicability of I/ical Rule 5. The court
then considered and rejected Anania's attempts to explain his past conduct as not
having been in bad faith. Some of the
i^xptaliaTions^were found to lie inconsistent
with or otherwise lacking support in the
record. Other explanations were found to
be incredible. The court concluded that
Anania had obstructed discovery and violated its orders. Citing deterrence as the
justification and finding it "obvious" that
Anania had been paid a "considerable" fee
for his services in representing Piper, the
court assessed costs and attorney's fees in
the amount of $10,000. Finally, the court
found the record to be "insufficient" to
determine whether Anania had been involved in or had knowledge of Piper's intentional destruction of requested documents. Believing further inquiry to be
warranted, however, the court referred the
matter to the Grievance Committee for the
Southern District of Florida.

II.

or his attorney to abide by court orders to
produce documents.- 1

Analysis.

In reviewing this case on appeal we find
that the true issues of consequence have
become confused
The court below has
assessed costs against Anania under Rule
37, but has framed its order as a defense of
the power of a federal court to impose
sanctions. Anania apparently does not contest the authority of the court to do what it
did; he asks rather that certain procedural
requisites be followed. The attorneys on
both sides in their briefs seem predominantly interested in trading pejorative and
vituperative epithets when the adequacy of
the process tendered by the district court is
the important question. We attempt to
clarify the issues and resolve this appeal by
considering first whether courts have the
authority, by whatever means derived, to
impose snncHous; second, whether there is
substantial evidence to support the imposition of sanctions on Anania; third, if sanctions are warranted, whether they were
imposed consistent with due process; and
fourth, if there is substantial evidence of
attorney misconduct, whether the amount
of costs assessed by the district court was
arrhed at by means consistent with the
requirements of law.
A. Sanctions
Ill

and Court
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Power.

It is beyond peradventure that all

by rule, and by common law, to impose
sanctions ngainst recalcitrant lawyers and
parties litigant. Congress enacted 28 U.S.
C.A. § 1927 (1985) permitting the court to
impose personal liability on an attorney for
"excels costs, expenses, and attorneys'
fees reasonably incurred" where that attorney "unreasonably and vexatiously" multiplies the pleadings in any case. Beyond
this, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide, in Rule 37(b), that failure by a
party or his counsel to make or cooperate
in court ordered discovery may, at the trial
court's discretion, lead to the imposition of
sanctions of several sorts. Relevant to this
nppeal is the final clause of Rule 37(b)(2)
providing for assessment of fees and expenses resulting from the failure of a party

Even absent explicit legislative enact
merit, deeply rooted m the common law
tradition is the power of any court to
"manage its affairs [which 1 necessarily in
chides the authority to impose reasonable
and appropriate sanctions upon errant lawyers practicing before it." Flaksa v J Attic
River Marine (yonstinction
Co, 389 F 2d
885, 888 n. 10 (5th Cir ), cert, denied, 392
U.S. 928, 88 S.Ct 2287, 20 L FA 2d 1387
(1908); accotd, Roadway Erpuss
Inc. r
Piper, 447 U S . 752, 701, 100 S.Ct 2155,
2403, 65 LFd.2d 488 (1980) ("There are
ample grounds for recognizing, however,
that in narrowly defined circumstances fed
era! courts have inherent power to a^se^s
attorney's fees against counsel"); I,ink r
Wabash R. Co., 370 U S . 020, 030-31, 82
S.Ct 1380, 1388 89, 8 I, Ed.2d 734 (190?)
(courts have "inherent power" to dismiss
an action sua sponfc as a sanction in orderto "achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases"); 4 \V Blackstone, Commentaries, *285-*80 (170)5) (noting power to
discipline for "rude and contumelious beha
viour" that "must necessarily he as ancient
as the laws themselves. For laws without
a competent authority to secure their administration from disobedience and con
tempt would be vain and nugatory") R)if
see, Societe Internationale
Pour
Paiticipations
Industi idles el Com met cwlr<t,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207, 78 S.Ct.
1087, 1093, 2 L E d 2d 1255 (1958) (Rule 37
is the exclusive source of authority for
sanctions in discovery abuse) {obiter dictum ) .
All of these bases, relied upon b\ the
court below, support its assertion of power
to impose sanctions for bad faith conduct
during discovery
But Anania challenges
the court's authority to impose a sanction
only indirectly. He argues rather that
there is insufficient evidence on the record
to support a finding of bad faith conduct
and that proper procedural
protections
were denied when, without adequate notice
3.

"In lieu of any of the foregoing orders oi in
addition thereto, the court shall require the par
ty failing to obey the order or the attorney
advising him or both to pay the reasonable

and before ;\ partial tubunal, he was found
to have acted in bad faith
B

Substantiality
Faith

of Kudence

of Bad

{21 The Supreme Court has stated in
language plain and firm that the standard
of review for an appellate court in considering an appeal of sanctions under Rule 37 is
sharply limited to a search for abuse of
discretion and a determination that the
findings of the trial court are "fully supported by the record." National
Hockey
League v Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.,
427 U S . 079. 042 13, 90 S.Ct 2778, 278081, 49 L E d ? d 747 (1970) (per
curiam);
A-tcc Steel Co. v Florida Steel Coip, 091
F 2d 480, 482 (11th Cir 198?) (pet cimam ),
cett denied, 100 U S . 1040, 103 S.Ct. 1433,
75 L E d 2d 792 (1983); Gnffhi
v. Aluminum (yo>/) of America, 501 F 2d 1171,
1172 (5th Cir 1977) {per cunam)
The
Court in National Hockey League admonished the Courts of Appeals not to exhibit
"lenity" even in the faro of "outright dis
missal as a sanction for failure to comply
with a discovery order" because Rule 3 7
sanctions were designed "not merely to
penalize tho^e whosp conduct mav be
deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to
defer those who might be tempted to such
conduct in the absence of such a deter
r e n t " When reviewing allegations that
-tbe—fimtmgs of a district court are clea^dyerroneous we are guided by the language
of National
Hockey League and by the
definition provided by the Supreme Court
in United States v. United States
Gypsum
Co, 333 U.S 301, 395, 08 S Ct 525, 541, 92
L E d , 740 (1918), that a finding is clearly
erroneous if "the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed."
[3J Here, a careful review of the record
as a whole shows no reversible error on the
question of misconduct. In fact the record
e v ppn«rs, including attorney's f c s . caused hy
the failure, unless the court finds that the fail
u i e was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust "
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is legion with Anama's misconduct and bad
faith A few examples suffice to encapsu
late the record presented
(1) Anania was found to have wrongfully
terminated the Lock Haven discovery pro
duction sessions
He claimed good faith
disputes remained about the scope of the
requests for production when he decided to
terminate this session and argued that on
short notice the burden of producing doc
ument originals was e x c e s s i - ^ Yet the
district court had already resolved the dis
pute over originals expressly in Carlucci's
favor, and Anania did not make even a
"best effort" attempt to comply He even
went so far as to instruct a witness "not to
respond to questions regarding the avail
ability of originals" when in fact the doc
ument custodian had admitted that produc
tion of the originals "would only take a few
minutes " On more than one occasion the
court had considered the scope of the re
quest and ordered Piper to produce original
documents for discovery
Instead Anania
flew off to meet "prior commitments" in
Miami The district court properly found
that the burden was on Anania to seek
relief from the court in the event of a
scheduling conflict
He is "not free to
ignore the Order [of the district court] and
to impose his own time constraints on the
^proceeiiings^" X>4^1ei^>fUhe^istric^Gourtr
Record Excerpts at 182, accord, Guidry v
Continental
Oil Co, 640 F 2d 523, 533-34
(5th Cir), cert denied, 454 U S 818, 102
S Ct 96, 70 L Ed 2d 87 (1981), In re Sut
ter, 543 F 2d 1030, 1034-35 (2d Cir 1976)

der Rule 30(d), there is no authority of
which we are aware holding that a Rule
30(d) motion can be filed when the parties
are already under a direct court order to
continue the deposition until completed
The Supreme Court articulated the proper
procedure to be followed in instances such
as this in Manes? v Meyer?, 419 U S 449,
458, 95 S C t 584 590 42 L Ed 2d 574
(1975), where it held that "all orders and
judgments of court must be complied with
promptly
If a person to whom a court
directs an order believes that order is incor
rect the remedy is to appeal, but absent a
staj to comply promptly with the order
pending a p p e a l " Accord, Link, 370 U S
at 633 82 S C t at 1390 San
Antonio
Telephone Co v American
Tel & Tel
Co, 529 F 2d 694 694 (5th Cir) {per cu
nam ), cert denied, 429 U S 999, 97 S C t
527, 50 L E d 2d 610 (1976) There was no
stay here, and that obtainable under Rule
30(d) was properly brought before Judge
M irshall who had retained jurisdiction over
this matter by continuing the hearing to
December 21
r
As to the second justification, we frankly
find it incredible that Anania could so interpret the status of the Illinois action when
several other motions had been heard in
Jurlge Marshall's court and when Judge
Marslrall^h^aTTnl^f^D^^
had been expressly continued until the fol
lowing week Judge Marshall was there,
CaWucci s counsel likewise Only Anania
failed to appear

14] (2) Anania likewise wrongfully ter
minated the production session held under
court order in Chicago He contends first
that the Rule 30(d) motion was filed in good
faith to protect his deponent from the
abuse of Carlucci s counsel and second that
he was directed by Judge Marshall to file
that action in the District Court in Florida
Even if we were to accept the first excuse
that his failure to appear was justified be
cause he was in Florida seeking relief un

(3) Anania made conflicting representations to the court below as to the existence
of investigative reports While Anania denies this, it is clear from the record, and
from Judge Campbell's order of March 3QK
1984, that such misleading statements were
made Anania first answered that the requested reports did exist, but he objected
to their production on grounds of work
product privilege and burdensomeness
He likewise told the court that the documents existed at a hearing before Judge

Anania correctly argues that an objection to
production may be based on the ground of
excessive burden without the defendant first
having to undertake an exhaustive search for
the requested documents But here the district

court did not find bad faith conduct because an
exhaustive search had not been undertaken
Rather the finding was based on the failure of
Anania to undertake any reasonable search tf*„
all before filing the objection

Paine on May 18 1982 Later Anania stat
ed "unequivocally" that the documents did
not exist He seizes upon this later denial
as evidence that the court was not misled
because he then stated clearly that no re
ports existed
But the issue of whether
reports did exist was still an open question
at that time The court's statements sim
ply set out the conflict and did not resolve
it It was not until March 30 1984 that
the court was able to d( termine that the
documents in question had in fact existed
and had been destroyed
In short, on the entire evidence we are
not "left with the definite and firm convic
tion that a mistake has been committed ' as
required by US Gypsum
In fact we are
left with little doubt but that the court
below could properly have reached no other
conclusion If this case is not a paradigm
of the abuse that sanctions under Rule 37
are to correct we would have great diffi
culty hypothesizing one that is
C The Requirement
of Due Process
Anania advances three claims that he
was denied the right to due process of law
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution
He argues
first that the court below failed to follow
^he^^devant^oeal—ru^esHtoi^th^^SoiittieTn
District of Florida second that when im
posing sanctions after settlement of the
underlying controversy the court should re
fer possible sanctions to an independent
body, and third that he did not receive
notice adequate to inform him that his
rights were being adjudicited and precisely
what matters were to bo considered in mak
ing that adjudication We consider each in
turn
5

Local Rule 5 p-ovides in relevant part
A The court will utilize its Grievance Com
mittee as established and accordinglv act
upon the reports and recommendations of
that committee provided that this rule shall
in the discretion of the Court constitute an
alternate method of processing allegations of
misconduct
B When misconduct or allegations of mis
conduct which if substantiated would war
rant discipline on the part of an attorney
admitted to practice before this Court shall
come to the attention of a Judge of this Court

1) The Local

Rules

[5J The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida has prom
ulgated rules of discipline to govern the
conduct of attorneys appearing in practice
before it Such rules operate parallel to,
but not inconsistent with, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Fed R Civ P 83
In essence, Anania argues that he is being
disciplined by the district court and accord
ingly has a right under Local Rule 5 to
have his alleged misconduct considered b>
either of the optional mechanisms set forth
in that Rule 5 Both avenues provide for
30 day notice of such proceedings and,
when the compl tint is initiated bv a judge
based on a case before him hearing before
a three judge panel, none of whom was
otherwise involved with the underljing
case For Anania the trial court followed
neither of these requirements
Though Mr Anania has everv right to
expect and receive notice and a fair adjudi
cation of his case we find th it the local
rules are not applicable in this case Proper characterization of the action below,
which was based on a bad faith obstruction
of discovery rather than a breach of the
ethical norms governing the attorney-client
relationship traditionally proscribed by a
UTjfes^TOTiat^o^e^Tu^ltes^hls^TteaT
LocaT
Rule 5 does clearly direct the convening of
a Grievance Committee or appointment of a
"special prosecutor ' of sorts in "processing
allegations of misconduct " But we must
rely upon Local Rule 4 to give meaning to
Local Rule 5 for it is the former that
provides a definition of the operative term
"misconduct" as those acts which 'violate
the Code of Professional Responsibility'
adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida fi
whether b \ complaint or otherwise and the
applicable procedure is not otherwise n n n d a t
cd by th^se Rules the Judge shall refer the
matter to counsel or investigation and the
prosecution of a form il disciphnai-v proceed
ing or the formulation of such other recom
mendation as may be appropriate
6.

Rule 4 B provides that
Acts or omissions by an attorney admitted to
practice before this Court
which violate
the Code of Piofessional
Responsibility
adopted by this Coutt shall constitute miscon
duct and shall be grounds for discipline

CHe aa 775 F J d 1440 (1981)

Because the Florida Code of Professional
Responsibility is not extant in the record
below, and because Anania cites no specific
provisions of that Code in defense of his
chim that his conduct is of the sort governed by the Code, we are forced to extra
polate from another provision of the local
rules, Rule 12, providing that the rules of
discipline are not properly construed as denying the courts "such powers»sj are nee
essary for the Court to maintain control
over proceedings conducted before it
"7
We hold that implicit in this reservation of
power for the district court is a rejection of
Anama's contention that the requirements
of Local Rule 5 govern
We note further that a decision contrary
would violate the similar reservation of
Federal Civil Rule 83, which rule provides
that local rules may not be "inconsistent
with these rules " We think it clear from
the firm language of the Supreme Court in
a number of cases that the power of feder
al courts to curb abuses of the discovery
process is not to be hamstrung by the
additional procedural burdens of local rules
if such rules would have the effect of limiting the force and effect of Federal Rule 37
Roadway Express, 447 U S at 763-64, 100

S J ^ at 2462-63,
Uaglie7^2^Yirmr^S
Link,

National Hockey
Ct^tT278l7

370 U S at 632, 82 S Ct at 1389

2) Sanctions After
Settlement
Anama's second due process claim is derived from the first and fails for the same
reason
He argues that the policy announced by the Supreme Court in cases like
Roaduay Express and National
Hockey
League is not implicated here because
those cases contemplated a strict apphca
tion of Rule 37 in ongoing litigation so as
to facilitate or compel compliance with dis
covery orders Such concerns would be
inapposite here, he argues, because the underlying action has been settled, accordingThe Code of Professional Responsibility
adopted by this court is the Code of Profes
sional Responsibility adopted by the highest
court of the state in which this Court sits
7.
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Local Rule 12 reads in full

ly obedience to the trial court's orders
would not be furthered by disposing of the
case under Rule 37
This fails for three reasons First, it
squarely contradicts the language of the
Supreme Court in National
Hockey
League, 427 U S at 643, 96 S Ct at 2781,
where the Court made clear that sanctions
for discover} violations serve "not merely
to penalize those whose conduct may be
deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to
deter those who might be tempted to such
conduct in the absence of such a deterrent " (emphasis supplied) We must en
force Rule 37 sanctions "diligently"
Roadway Express, 447 U S at 763, 100
S C t at 2462 If the rule is not so en
forced, "it might well be that these respondents would faithfully comply with all fu
ture discovery orders
in this case But
other parties to other lawsuits would fee]
freer t h i n we think Rule 37 contemplates
to flout other discovery orders of other
district courts " National Hockey League,
427 U S at 643, 96 S Ct at 2781 (emphasis
m original), Aztec Steel, 691 F 2d at 482
It is neither necessary nor appropriate for
an infenor federal court to engraft upon
Rule 37 a procedural mechanism more de^flandmg^than^ 4hat which—the—Supreme^
Court has deemed adequate to both guarantee due process and vindicate the policy
underlying that
rale
u
[6] Second, we previously held in Gui~
dry, 640 F 2d at 534, that the district court
properly assessed a $500 fine against counsel for discovery violations after the record
on the underlying case was closed and the
appeal was already filed The posture of
the underlying claim was itself irrelevant
to the decision of the trial court to impose
sanctions We recognize the correctness of
that holding and reaffirm today the
breadth of discretion we afford our district
courts to deal with attorney misconduct m
Nothing contained in these Rules shall be
construed to deny to this Court such powers,
as are necessary for the Court to maintain
control over proceedings conducted bfor* S
such as proceedings for contempt under liuc
18 of the United States Code or under Rule «
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-,

ways they deem best suited to each in
stance of nonfeasance
Anama's argument fails on a third level
By making the status of the underlying
action controlling over who may adjudicate
allegations of discovery misconduct (that is
by the federal judge hearing the case or by
the special three judge pinel) and wh it
standards will inform their deliberations
(Federal Rule 37 or some local provision)
the effect is to bind the hands of the trial
court in an area where the Supreme Court
h i s ruled we should promote maximum
flexibility
It would deprive the district
judge of the option to defer a ruling on
sanctions so as to allow the errant attorney
an opportunity to "purge" himself of the
wrongdoing, or at least to mitigate his pen
alty, by henceforth cooperating in dis
covery 8 Anama's argument would force a
court to choose between imposing an ippro
pnate sanction for each instance of bad
faith discovery conduct at the time it oc
curred, certifying each episode to a griev
ance panel, or waiting until the underlying
litigation has been completed and then for
warding the entire matter to the grievance
committee or appointed counsel for investi
gation and a hearing before judges not
8

Indeed such an opportunity was afforded
here it was only on Carlucci s third motion to
strike in the face of recalcitrance by Piper and
by Anania that the district court finally had
enough and entered the order to show cause

9

The only case with which we are f a u u l n r that
might be taken to support A m m a s position is
Untied States v Vague 697 F 2d 805 (7th Cir
1983) That case involved the refusal of an
attorney to lower his apparently exorbitant fee
upon order of the trial court during sentencing
proceedings
The court and the attorney
sparred for s e v e n ! weeks over the fee with the
court ultimately holding the attornev in con
tempt The Seventh Circuit reversed reasoning
that the combination of prosecutorial and adju
dicative functions in the trial judge violated the
due process guarantee of an impartial tribunal
Rather that court held the matter should have
been referred to an independent prosecutor un
der local rules
We find Vague distinguishable because it in
volved a disciplinary inquiry entirely separate
in subject matter from the underlying action
The exorbitant fee question and the facts mate
rial to that issue were altogether different from
t\«,-

-
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previously imolved, with the expense and
delay concomitant Were we so to hold we
would be transforming most citations of
misconduct during discovery into full
fledged disciplinary proceedings
This
would mire trial courts m endless deliys
while panels were constituted to consider
potential viohtions of Rule 37 with the
attendant result contrary to the clear hold
ing of the Supreme Court of discouraging
trial courts from imposing sanctions in the
first place
Further, it would cast into
doubt the power of a district court to hold
contempt proceedings during the course of
litigation since such proceedings cirry pen
alties more severe than those imposed in
discovery matters Clearly this is not what
the Supreme Court intended, nor wh it we
would find desirable in the courts of this
Circuit, nor even what Local Rule 12 appre
hends '
3) Right to Notice and Hearing
[7] Anama's third due process claim is
that he was not afforded constitutionally
adequate notice of the charges against him
or given adequate opportunity to defend
himself against these allegations He sug
gests to us In re Ruffalo, 390 U S 544 88
S Ct 1222, 20 L Ed 2d 117 (1968), as setting
forth the constitutional requisites, 10 and ar
Sending the matter to the local committee in
volved no overlap of judicial resources
By
contrast here the resolution of the numerous
discovery disputes and the decision to impose
sanctions on the appellant even after the under
Iving action had been settled were inextricably
intertwined Further the Vague case involved
contempt sanctions which have historically re
quired greater due process protection since they
often carry criminal as opposed to civil penal
ties
Even if the case could not be distin
guished we find it unpetsuasive because it has
policy implications that we think arc ill advised
and is contrary to binding precedent
10 In re Ruffalo involved a disciplinary action
against an attorney accused of soliciting clients
The original charge enumerated twelve distinct
counts of barratry At a hearing however a
thirteenth count was added after the attorney
defendant had presented his defense The state
board sanctioned the attorney on the thirteenth
count The Supreme Court reversed holding
that the charge must be known before the
proceedings commence Thev become a trap
when after thev are underway the charges are
amended on the basis of testimony of the ac
r. e-A
ion ii q -,t «;<;i RR <; c\ it \r>t>
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gucs t i n t tho district c o u r t s show m i i p
order did not inform hun of all of tho
drcovery conduct for which ho would he
c ill( d upon to m s w e r He points to sever
il findings m the district court s fin i) order
th it lie clums were not expressly men
honed in the show cinse order h i v i n g him
unprepared to contest them i t the finil
heiring before ludgos Pune and Cimi bell
I h e court below chtncreri7es the 'find
i n g s ' it issue i s 'obsorvitions ' mide in
re ponse to An uu i s ittc mpt to e xplun his
ictions as hiving been founded in good
futh

inquiries from which resulted the findings
of bid futh conduct
Notice necessary
w is given by the court incident to e i c h o£
those proe eeehngs A n a n n does not con
test the ideejuicy of the notice in the e i r h
er proceedings but directs his argument to
the fmil heiring held before the imposition
of the $10 000 sinction

In we iphing the ideejuicy of notice and
he inng in the finil iction we ire guided by
the holding in Link
170 U S at 612 82
S ( t i t U89 where the Court upheld the
sinction of dismiss\1 of an iction even m
the f ice of cl urns of insufficient notice and
Rulfnlo r not controlling bote The dis
opportunity for a heiring ' [FJvery order
tmction between discover) sinctions mrl entered without notice m d i preliminary
formal disc lphmrv, proceedings tint forced idvorsiry heiring [does not I of fe nd due
us to re j cfrA n m i i q c him under the loe d prex ess Iheideriuuv, of notice md h e i r
rule1* hi ewise compels us to reject this ing respecting proceedings that m i \ if feet
chmi A n i n n s irgument ipnore s the fict
i party s rights turns to a considerable
t h i t the reh v m t findings of bid f nth con
extent on the knowledge which the circum
due t alleged i g i i n s t him hid ilready been
stances show such pirty mi} be taken to
mule epnte some tune before the order to
hive of the consoe]ucnces ol his own con
show CIU«*P w i s r s u t d The findings were
duet ' "
mide during the course of discover} in the
We find it cleir from the record that
Orders of November 17 198? of December
28 1981 m d of M \rch 10 1984
The A n u u i w i s given the full mei^ure ind
Fven though find
record reflee ts t i n t in e ich cise imple more of process due
opportunity was iffoidcd for Anini i to be ings of bid filth conduct in discovery hid
aire uly been mide the district court p ive
b e n d on the f u t u i l mittcrs being con
side red Briefs were filed before the order A n n u a i n idditionil opportunity to be
Ihe
of November 17 i pretrial confer* nee w r he ird before imposing sinctions
held before the December 28 order briefs show cause order refeienced the pnor find
were filed and a heiring w i s held before ings of bid filth conduct in the orders
A^Ter^farrrr^O^oreler The express purpose
of the fmil heiring was only to consider seived the issue of sinctions for i later
the issue of ^auction?
It w i s not to con
date) md March 30 1984 (which h i d an
stitute i formil chsnphniry proceeding to nounced the possibility of 'more severe
consider the ch irges dt noio
The fair sine horn ) (iivcn the protracted history
notice reejmrement of Rvffolo ipplies of of discovery in this cise ind the repeated
course, to each of the district courts prior findings of bad faith, we find that the show
1!

likewise in Gtudtj we upheld sanctions un
der Rule 17 where the attorney cmsr-d uuncces
sary discovery e r { ens'* even while no technical
vi ilition of any pailiculai rule wis made by
Cuidry s r o u n d
lw ausc the n n p i s i t i m of
sanctions m this case was in keeping with the
s u n t of the rules
640 T 2d it 511 If sane
tions n n y be imp >sed even absent -\ technical
violitio
then clearly in a ease* such as this
where counsels misconduct wa« recognized by
the roiut nri three s par ate oera ions theie can
l e n ) question but that the ihtc pi en ess reqiiin
in ut of adequate notice was rue. t
Se ah i
Maigolcs v Johis
587 F 2d 885 888-89 (7th

Cir 197R) (district court refused to p n n t eviden
tiarv heaimg reparduig sanctions for failure to
follow court discover directive
notinp the
voluminous factual d tad provided to the dls
trict coutt th co ut of appeals held thai 1 full
hearing with oral arpument was not requited
because it would have been cumulative ) Ed
gar \ Shufhtcr
548 T 2d 770 773 (8th Cir
1977) (trial court should enter i n order to
show cause and hold a bearing if deemed nee
e sary to dHcitninc whether assessment of
costs and atforniy fees or even an attorneys
citation for contempt would be
just and
effective sanction )
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ciuse notice w i s ideepnte to inform Ani
m i of the issues to be decided it the find
heiring under the link
st md ird
No
' c b i r g e s ' need hive been specified Ihe
sole issues to be decided were the form ind
measure of s Mictions Under these circum
stances there is no merit to Anini \ s i r g u
ment t i n t the e i r h e r orders weie made
emite

it (,U 9(. S ( t
F 2d i t 482

i t 2781

Aztec

Steel

091

[111 On ipp* d however we c innot re
ibsheillv, hold ig u r r t tins s t i n d i r d the
determmition of the court below unle s
there is offered on the record both a justifi
cition for the sinction ind i n iccounting
bv the court ind bv, the pirty idverse to
the nonfei m t l i w \ e r of the r e i s m n b l e
ecp'nse
mrludmg ittornev s fe( s ciused
D Uw $10 000
Santtwn
hv the fiilun
Accordmglv in e ises
IRJ Mr A n i n n s fmil contention is th it
invoking the sinction powe r of Rule M the
in is^essmp i p u n s t him the $10000 <noc
distnet court must cl< irlv st ite its re i
turn the court b< lo\ filled to pi tee on the
sons so th it me imngful revi< w mi> be h id
record evidence sufficient to c xplun how it
on ippe il
\lihon
'
\ot!*unqrn
of
irrived i t t i n t figure i s furlv, re flective of
/t?/>CMee7 Inc %1 rid 191 r>0r> (4th ( ir
the costs entiile d in An mi i s greiss misc on
1977) eeit dtnud
411 U S 1020 98 S ( t
duet
Ihe re fore the fine is he irgtu s
711 r)1 I I eMd 7(8 (1978) When pressed
i r b i t n r } m d b ise d on unsuppoitcd is
for surh evidence ind ^p< nfie findings on
sumptions Finding the order b» low to be
the rerord below counsel for the ippellees
deficient m t i n t the district coutt fuh el to
ron( e fie el i t o r d i r g u m e n t tint there w i
detail the b isis fe>r n r i v i n g i t the sum of
none
In the instant cise the coutt of
$10 000 we igroe ind on this ground ilone
fered four gene i il ju-tifie itions for its or
we reverse ind remind
d r 1) the m t u r e of the misconduct 2) trV
[9,101 Ihe t r n l coutt imposed situ
f vet th it An i n n s con loot w i s burdensome
tions under the fin \1 cliuse of Fedet il Rule
on the court ^) the deterrence fie tor un
-17(b) which provides t i n t i court m iv
de r l \ m g Rule T7 ind 4) the fee th it An i
properly pen ihze uncooper itive ittornevs m i earned through th* impioper conduct
or pirtios h t i g m t in chscoveiy pioteedings T i n t s u d the court ordered An i n n to piv
by requiring the pigment of re ison ibh
$10 000 to the registr} of the district court
expenses m\ \ui\mg attorney s \>es c wv^evv. without recourse to his client
Rut the
bv the fulure
" The s t i n d i r d of re
court below filled to set forth in iceount
view m cises of this sort is ibuse of discre
ing ichepiite to justify the figure it
tion I h e migmtude of sinctions iwarded
adopteel
i s T o u n d e d muITl^RuTe 7 'il onl) b>
tintWe note from the record that the rniscon
which is ' r e i s o n a b l e ' in light of the cir
duct of An m n ivtn alia forced the \p
cumstmces12
Permissible purpeses of
obviously
sine tion include 1) eompemsitmg the court pomtmont of i special mi tor
c
and other pirties for the idded expen-e ftitiihng fees mel costs ciu ed ehscoverv
disputes resulting m s ^ f n l fruitless pi me
ciused b> the ibusive conduct 2) compel
trips b \ ( irlucci s ittorney ind st iff ind
hng discovery 3) deterring others from
neee ssitate el numerous heiring 1 * and orders
engiging in s u n i h r conduct ind 4) penil
from four federal district court judges
l/ing the guilt} pirtv. or ittornev,
Road
vni/Expyi^
447 U S i t 7bt 100 S 11 i t While An i n n argues t i n t the fine imj osed
w is ' grossly excessive taken together
2463 National Ho<key Uagui
427 U S
12 We exprc slv decline Ananias invitation lo
permit consideration of die prr* m l s i l u a l u u
of one subject to p<*nalt> in dctcrminuiF the
a p p r o p r n t e sanction
We find no evil nee in
the Federal Rules in the relevant statutory en
actments or m the case h w t ) sup P ( st tint it
would in nn\ w iv be ar | i o p i n i o f r a ce m t to
consider such circumstances The sole concern

is with the far htati i< of di rovcrv and the
d f t e n e n c e of abuse of that pi occss
We a h )
nr te that p rhaps if Mr \t if n In I cr. risidcre 1
both l i s furilv and f»r an«~nl oblip tions a I
his obhpati >ns as an o l f t c r of the c > irt be
mipht nit 1 in the situation m which he pics
ently finds himself
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Anama's handiwork may well hive imount
ed to $10,000 The court on remand upon
a full accounting may, in its discretion,
determine that a sanction gt eater thin
$10,000 is warranted It may also find that
the fine is hotter deemed costs to be pud in
full or p i r t to Cirlucci and/or her ittorney
to compensite them for their expenses
W P simply are in no position to resolve t h i t
question on ippp ll Rather, we must reverse and remand on this issue so that the
district court m i y create a record account
ing for costs adequate to sustain whatever
sanction that court ultimately decides is
justified in light of the repeated refusal of
Anama to abide by that court's d^povery
directives
AFFIUMTI) in p i r t and RFVLRSLD in
part and REMANDED
FAY, Circuit Judge, concurring
Though cagreemg completely with Judge
Johnson's opinion for the court, I feel compelled to add these few words
Some years ago a verv wise and expen
enced trial judge said "Professional courte
sy is the lubricant that allows the wheels of
justice to turn smoothly " ' The courts of
this nation cannot function without the full
support of all members of the bar Attor
ne>s are officers of the court
It is their
primary responsibiht) to see that our system of jurisprudence works
Unfortunately—m-^-ny^opmiOfl—the—last^
twenty five ) e a r s have seen a great rise in
the number of individuals admitted to the
practice of law and a great decline in pro
fessional standards Sheer numbprs makes
it impossible for judges to "teach" voung
law>ers how to pr ictice 1 iw Such mstruc
tion must come from a combination of all
segments of the legal profession
Appellant is a member of one of our
nation's most respected law firms Clear
ly, he should have known his conduct was
totally abhorrent to the standards of our
profession No client—large or small rich
or poor, with or without influence—can be
allowed to corrupt our system of junspru
1

Circuit Judge G n d y C n u f o r d Circuit Court
in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Flor

dence to protect his, her or its self interests
It is my persona) observation that too
man) practitioners have "sold out to the
client " While the actual numbers of those
who have done so may not be great, the
trend can be disastrous' Advocacy must
be earned out within the rules The Eng
hsh differentiate between "solicitors" and
"banisters"
Barristers receive special
training and present the cases in court
Their traditional values, quality of scholar
ship and loyalty to the courts is known
world widp In this country we have devel
oped many certification procedures for specialists in certain areas of the law The
federal courts are implementing new proce
dures for the admittance of practitioners in
an effort to improve the quality of advoca
cy What we must never forget is that we
all serve as "officers of the court " Failing
in this endeavor, we will lose much more
than merely the case at hand

[o

SKLTNUMBIRSYSIIM

district judge abused its discretion in dis
missing with prejudice
Reversed and remanded with instruc
tions
1 Criminal Law O r >77 15(1)
Delay of less than 80 d a \ s from filing
of defendants speedy trial motion was in
sufficient to implicate constitutional con
cerns U S C A Const Amend 6
2 Criminal Law <S=>577 16(11)
District court abused its discretion in
dismissing case with prejudice under
Speedy Trial Act [18 U S C A § 3162(a)(2)]
because more than 70 nonexcludable days
had passed, where charges were serious
delay was slight and no findings were
made concerning adverse impact on admin
istration of Act and justice in general
Stanley Marcus, U S Attv
Jon M \y,
David O Leiwant Linda Collins Hert7
Asst U S Attys , Miami, Fla , for plaintiff
appellant
Jeffrey A Miller, Bruce Rogow Fort
Lauderdale, F l a , for defendant appellee
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida

UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Al PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 84-5895.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit
Nov 12, 1985
Government appealed from order oi
the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, James C
Paine J dismissing indictment with preju
dice under Speedy Trial Act The Court of
Appeals, Vance, Circuit Judge, held that
idn Dade County Florida

Before VANCE and HATCHEIT Circuit
Judges, and ATKINS *, District Judge

This is the second appeal by the govern
ment in this casp following the district
court's dismissal with prejudice of a multi
count indictment against anpellee, Al Phil
hps
On the prior appeal we concluded
that the district court had improperly ap
plied a presumption that dismissals under
the Speedy Trial Act should be with prpju
dice We directed that on remand it consid
er the factors enumerated in 18 U S C
§ 3162(a)(2) without the influence of the
improper presumption On remand the dis
trict court again considered the matter and
again ruled that the dismissal should be
with prejudice
We now conclude that
• H o n o r a b l e C Cl>dc Atkins U S District Judge
for the Southern District of I londa silting by
designation

such ruling constituted an abuse of discretion We therefore reverse the judgment
of dismissal with prejudice and remand
with directions that a judgment of dismis
sal without prejudice be entered
I

Iacts

and Procedural

History

An indictment charging Phillips and oth
ers with several offenses involving man
juana importation was filed but sealed on
March 17, 1983 The indictment was un
sealed on March 23 1983 and on that date
Phillips was arrested He entered a plea of
not guilty On April 18 1983 and again on
Ma) 17, 1983 the U S Attorney filed
Speedy Trial reports in which he stated
t i n t t r u l must b* gin on June H 198}
'lhe case was set for trial on May 31, 1981,
but the trial was not held on that date
The reason does not appear in the record
At a hearing on Ma\ 2r> 1983 the district
judge advised counsel that the cise was
third on the June 6 calendar but stated,
"Looks like this won t bo tried it this
point " On June 22 1983 Phillips filed his
motion to dismiss under the Spend) Trial
Act because more than sevent) nonexclud
able days had pissed The government's
June 23 response did not oppose dismissal
but argued that the dismissal should be
without prejudice

[1] In its order on remand the district
court recogni7pd the correct analytical
framework mandated in United States v
Ruvo, 741 F 2 d 1264 (11th Cir 1984) It
also stated t i n t it must give consider ltion
to the factors enumerated m Barker v
Uuigo 407 U S 511 92 S Ct 2182 33
L Fd 2d 101 (1972) Its findings on remand
chronicle the events leading to dismissal,
but our understanding of the court s apph
cation of the Russo analysis is not aidnd by
an) relevant findings or explanations ex
eppt for statements of conclusion
Its ref
erpnee to Barker is more problematic since
less than eighty 1 da)s of nonexcludable
1

According to defendant s calculations ninety
one days had elapsed
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 3TATE OF UTAH

J
H.-WAYNE

WADSWORTH,

4

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF

JURY )R|AL PROCEEDINGS

PLAINTIFF,

5
VS.

(PARTIAL JURY VOIR

6

DIRE)

STANLEY C. MANN, ET AL.,

7

ito. C81-8644

CASE

DEFENDANTS.

8
9

BE IT REMEMBERED, THAlj ON THE 25TH DAY OF

10

JULY. 1984. COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 10:10 A.M., THE ABOVE-

II

ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING

12

CITY & COUNTY BUILDING, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; SAID CAUSE

13

BEING HEARD BY THE HONORABLE PHILIP R. FISHLER, JUDGE

14

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAhl.

11\ COURTROOM 409 OF THE

IN THE

15
APPEARANCES
16
17

RAY R. CHRISTENSEN. ATTORNEY AT LAW,

CHRISTENSEN,

18

JENSEN & POWELL, 900 KEARNS BUILDING, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

19

84101, TELEPHONE 355-3431, APPEARING 0N BEHALF OF THE

20

PLAINTIFF.

21

ROBERT P. SHERLOCK.

AT LAW, 261 EAST 300

ATTORNEY

22

SOUTH, SUITE 150, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAhi

23

355-1300, APPEARING ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT

84111, TELEPHONE
MANN.

24
25

JULIE N. CLEGG
CS.R, RPR, CM
5ALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

[84111

535-7363

4SS

1

(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROC E E D I N G ^ CONTINUED IN OPEN

2
COURT:)

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

THE

COURT!

LADIES

AGAINST THE STORM. WHICH

AND

UTAH.

I THINK

THE

I'M HOLDING V>P AGAIN,

WITH THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
AS A WHOLE.

GENTLJEMEN,

BOOK

ONE

IN PART DEALS

IT'S N C W THE LEGAL PROFESSION

IT DEALS WITH THE LEGAL PROFESSION

IN

IS THERE ANYONE HERE WHO HAS At^Y OPINION EITHER FOR

OR AGAINST THE LAWYERS WHO PRACTICE L/U

IN THE STATE OF UTAH?

IN OTHER WORDS, DO YOU FEEL THEY'RE E THER MORE TRUTHFUL

THAN

10 THE POPULACE AS A WHOLE?IF YOU FEEL THAT WAY, RAISE YOUR
11 HAND.
12
13

(PAUSE
THE COURT:

\ii

PROCEEDINGS.)

LET THE RECORD SHOW NO HANDS ARE RAISED
(WHEREUPON. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
WERE HAD BUT NOT HEREIN TRANSCRIBED PURSUANT TO REQUESTED
TRANSCR PT CONTENT.)

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

REPORTER'S

CERTIFICATE

I, JULIE N. CLEGG, CSR, RPR, CM, OFFICIAL COURT
REPORTER IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO
HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE
BY ME STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE TIMES AND PLACES
HEREIN SE FORTH; THAT THE SAME WAS SU&SEQUENTLY BY ME CAUSED
TO BE REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 AND
2: AND THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPf
TION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE ADnllCED, AND PROCEEDINGS
HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE.
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION

I HEREBY SET MY HAND THIS

21ST DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1985, AT SALT L^KE CITY, UTAH.
24
25

rU- %

LIE N. CLEGG, Cj
REGISTEJTE D PROFESSIONAL RtPCRTER
(uTAH CSR NO. 227)
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1

A

YES, IT IS.

2

0

GENERALLY, WHAT HAS BEEN THE NATURE OF YOUR PRAC-

A

MY PRACTICE HAS BEEN EXCLUSIVELY

3
4

T ICE?
IN THE FIELD

5

OF LITIGATION, AND PRIMARILY REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS IN

6

CASUALTY ACTIONS,

7
8
9

0

TO WHAT PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, IF ANY, DO YOU

BELONG?
A

THE FEDERATION OF INSURANCE COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL

10

BOARD OF TRIAL ADVOCACY, THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCI-

11

AT ION.

12

0

13
14

TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE YOU $EEN

INVOLVED

IN ACTIVI-

TIES OF THE UTAH STATE BAR?
A

WELL, IN MY EARLY PRACTICE, BECAUSE

I WAS

15

PRINCIPALLY A LITIGATOR, I SERVED AS A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

16

FOR THE BAR ON DISCIPLINARY CASES.

17
18

MR. SHERLOCK:

YOUR HONOF^ , THIS

IS IRRE>EVANT,

I BEL IEVE.

19

THE COURT:

20

APPROACH THE BENCH.
(WHEREUPON, A BENCH CONFERENCE
WAS HAD WITHIN THE PRESENCE
BUT OUT OF THE HEARING OF
THE JljiRY. )

21
22
THE COURT'.

OBJECTION SUSTAINED.

PROCEED.

23
0

(BY MR. CHRISTENSEN)

MR + WADSWORTH, OTHER THAN

24
ANY COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST YOU BY MR. MANN AS A RESULT
25

70

1

OF THIS SERIES OF LITIGATION THAT MR. SHERLOCK TALKED ABOUT

2

IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT, HAVE YOU HAD ANY DISCIPLINARY

3

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST YOU

IN THE UTAH STATE BAR?

4

A

NONE, OR ANYWHERE ELSE.

5

0

MR. WADSWORTH, HAVE YOU MAD OCCASION TO BECOME

6

ACQUAINTED WITH OR HAVE CONTACT WlJH STANLEY MANN, ONE

7

OF THE DEFENDANTS

8
9
10
11
12

A

ONLY

IN THIS CASE?

IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LITIGATION

THAT'S

BEEN MENTIONED.
0

AND WHEN DID YOU FIRST HAVE OCCASION TO HAVE

ANY CONTACT WITH HIM
A

IN THAT REGARD?
I
THERE WAS A COURT APPEARANCE ON JANUARY -- I

13

BELIEVE

14

TO AS A HEARING ON THIS CUSTODY MA TTER.

15

ING ON THE CUSTODY MATTER, BUT WAS) A HEARING ON WHETHER

16

THE UPCOMING HEARING ON THE CUSTODY MATTER SHOULD BE CON-

17

TINUED, AND

IT WAS THE 11TH -- OF 1979

THAT WAS REFERRED
IT WAS NOT A HEAR"

I BELIEVE THAT MR. MANJN WAS PRESENT
I

IN THE

18
COURTROOM AT THE TIME OF THAT LEGA|L ARGUMENT, ALTHOUGH

19
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TAKEN.

SO THERE WAS NO

INTERCOURSE

20
OF EXAMINATION, OR ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE, BUT I BELIEVE

21
HE WAS THERE.

22
0

THAT, TO YOUR RECOLLECTION,

IS THE FIRST TIME

23
THAT YOU EVER HAD OCCASION TO HAVEJ ANY KIND OF CONTACT

24
WITH HIM OR BE AWARE OF HIM, OR ANYTHING OF THAT SORT?

25
A

YES, SIR.

71
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HIMII

February 6,1981

Executive Director of the Bar
Utah State Bar Association
42S East 100-South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Dear Sir:
In October, 1980," we were approached by Mr. and Mrs. Stanley C. Mann
who wished us to represent Mrs. Mann as plaintiff in a malicious prosecution
action against three Salt Lake attorneys. Our initial skepticism was gradually
dispelled as we thoroughly investigated the Manns' allegations, before accepting the case. Ultimately, after extensive inquiries, Conferences and research,
we agreed to represent Mrs. Mann and filed the enclosed complaint As our
investigation
luon progressed,
progressed, we
we became
oecame aware
aware that
inai the
me conduct
conduct of
oi lawyers
lawyers was
was
involved in such a manner that we would be obligated to report our knowledge
under DR
R I-103^of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule JY* of the
Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. This letter is in
discharge of that obligation and responsibility.
We realize that the line between zealous representation' of a client and
malicious prosecution may be a fine one. We also realize, too, that we have
heard and investigated the facts only as they appear to our client, Mrs. Mann.
For this reason, in v^ovember\|,we approached the lawyers involved and
informed them of our investigation. We expressed a willingness to meet with
them to discuss the matter.if they so desired or to Answer any questions. We
hoped to hear new facts, ^explanations, denials or e^en offers to settle. We
received no response. In December^ we contacted t^iem again to inform them
that the complaint had been prepared and we made copies available to them
before service. Again there was no response.
We feel that we have no choice but to report to you that*according to
the information that we received from our client,! Louise S. Mann, and her
husband, Stanley C. Mann, and information revealed by public record and our
own investigation, attorneys H. Wayne Wadsworth, David S. Young, and
Stephen A. Trost appear to have engaged in conduct contrary to the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly DR 1-102, Dif 2-109, DR 7-102 and with
regard to David S. Young, DR 4-101. As this conducti is, for the most part, the
same conduct which forms the basis for our cii^nC? cause of action, we

%

l«

enclose a copy of the complaint for your use and refer you to the ongoing
pleadings on file with the court. We are ready to be of any assistance in the
resolution of this matter.

Sincerely,
LUND A ASSOCIATES

Lynn J. Lund
Attorney at Law

Kathleen |B. Barrett
Attorney at Law
LJL9KBB:kkg
Enci.

Tab 14

1

OR OTHER ATTORNEYS.
THE COURT!

2
3

NO

4
5

WELL, HE CAN ANSWER THAT "YES" OR

MR. SHERLOCK:

THE COURT:

7

MR. SHERLOCK:

9

AND HE ANSWERED

'YES'

6

8

THAT S RIGHT,

0

ALL RIGHT,

I'M TRYING TO FIND THE DOCUMENT.

(BY MR. SHERLOCK)

AS "EXHIBIT 14-D"

ASK YOUR NEXT QUESTION.

LET Mt SHOW YOU WHAT

AND ASK YOU IF THAT

IS MARKED

IS A COPY OF THE

10

DOCUMENT WHICH YOU HAD IN YOUR POS$ESSION TO WHICH YOU

11

REFER.

12

A

YES.

13

Q

AND WHAT DID YOU DO ON

14

TikE BASIS OF EXHIBIT

14-D?

15

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. SHERLOCK:

18 MALICIOUS INTENT,

I HAVEN'T SEEN

ARE YOU OFFERING

14-D.

14-D?

I WILL OFI^ER IT ON THE ISSUE OF

THE COURT HAS RULED ON THAT.

19

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

20

THE COURT:

MAY WE APPROACH THE BENCH?

YES

21

(WHEREIJJPON, A BENCH CONFERENCE
WAS HA(f) WITHIN THE PRESENCE
BUT OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE
JURY.)

22
23
THE COURT:

YOU'RE WITHDRAWING 14?

24
MR. SHERLOCK:

25

I'LL WITHDRAW 14.

Tab 15

1

YOU CAN GET YOURSELF

2

SO HIS TRUST MONEY WAS NEVER -- OR THE TRUST MONEY OF DAVID

3

WAS NEVER DISCUSSED

4

AND, IN FACT, MARK WHEELER WENT TO ANOTHER ATTORNEY THAT

5

WROTE TO INSURANCE COMPANIES, AND THOSE -- WELL, THE

6

INSURANCE COMPANIES THAT HAD POLICIES WHEREIN DAVID WAS

7

THE BENEFICIARY.

8
9

0

A

IN CONNECT I ON WITH THE CUSTODY ACTION.

I HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THAT.

DID YOU ANTICIPATE ANY PERSONAL GAIN

WAS SUCCESSFUL

10

INTO A LOT Oij LEGAL PROBLEMS. AND

IF MARK

IN OBTAINING CUSTODPY OF THE CHILD?

ABSOLUTELY NOT.

AFTER TlHE CUSTODY MATTER WAS

1!

HANDLED, IF I HAD WANTED ANY OF THAT MONEY, I COULD HAVE

12

MADE A PETITION TO THE COURT FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF FEES,

13

AND

14

A CHILD BACK TO ITS NATURAL FATHER OR TO ITS FATHER --

15

ADOPTIVE FATHER, IN THIS CASE -- WAS A JUSTIFIED EXPEND I-

16

TURE.

17

PECTED MARK WHEELER TO PAY MY FEES.

18

MY FEES AND THAT BECAME OBVIOUS, THEN

19

CASE.

20

I SUPPOSE MOST ANY COURT WOULD HAVE FOUND THAT GIVING

I NEVER MADE ANY APPLICATIOlf|N FOR SUCH FEES.

0

I EX-

WHEN HE COULDN'T PAY
I WITHDREW FROM THE

I WISHED ALSO TO CALL YOLlR ATTENTION TO THE LAST

21

PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 184, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN EXCERPTED BUT

22

WHICH, STARTING WITH THE FOURTH L 1 KlE DOWN, SAYS (QUOTE)

23

OBVIOUSLY THIS WAS A BIT OF LEGAL DEALERY.

24

TO BLAME ME IN ORDER TO DEFAME MY CHARACTER.

25

THIS WOULD HELP THEM GET THEIR HANpS ON THE MONEY, AND

WADSWORTH PLOTTED)
HE THOUGHT

94
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*/W/
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH
of and for
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
Attorneys for Mark W. Wheeler,
Father
310 South Main, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
801/363-3300

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
I
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of:

MEMORANDUM OF DISBURSEMENTS
AND COSTS

DAVID MARK NEWTON WHEELER,
A Minor.

Probate No. P 79-2

Pursuant to Rule 54, btah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Jo
petitioner Mark W. Wheeler submits the following memorandum of
CO * < •

his necessary costs and disbursements in this action.

u
10 K

1.
c

U

Air travel of petitionerIwheeler from
Burbank, California, to Jj>alt Lake
City, Utah for:
(a)

January 12, 1979 hearing (not
claimed, necessary ^o pick up
minor child)

(b)

June 20, 1979 deposition

(c)

July 23, 1979 trial

52
W W

$

182.00
182.00

Witness fees, January 12,1 1979 hearing:
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)
(e)

Donald Waldman, Northridge,
California, 1 day, l|75 miles from
Utah border . . .

$

Dent Hale, Northridge,
California, 1 day, l|75 miles from
Utah border
. . .

66.50

66.50

Sylvi Wheeler, Northridge,
California, 1 day, 1)75 miles from
Utah border
. . .

$

66.50

Roger Hacking, Vernaf, Utah,
1 day, 176 miles .

$

66.80

Marlyn Mix, Jerome, Idaho,
1 day, 102 miles to Utah border

$$

44 60

3.

Witness f e e s , July 23, 1J979 t r i a l :
(a)

S y l v i Wheeler, Nort^hridge
C a l i f o r n i a , 1 day, 175 tniles from
Utah border . . .

(b)

(c)

Depositions of Dr Robert H. Marshall,
William Richard Treju , Keith R. Haight
and Norma N. Waldman

$

Attorney's fees inclurr ed in custody
case, 80.75 hours alt $75.00/hour

$6,056.2!

TOTAL COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS

J

$7,079.21

Attorneys for Mark W. Wheeler,
Father

a < i x

STATE OF UTAH

»in

281.6(

R. WAYNE WADSWORTH
of and for
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

* O

z n 0
V) c < W

66. 5(

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

8S.

H. WAYNE WADSWORTH, after having been first duly sworn,
deposes and says that he is the attorney for petitioner, Mark W.

$
Wheeler, that he is better ihformed than is the petitioner
Wheeler regarding the costs and disbursements incurred in
connection with the above referenced matter and that the costs
and disbursements listed above were reasonably and necessarily
^

incurred in said action.
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 31st day of
August, 1979.

NQTAF
f ARY PUBLIC
^
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:

-2-

Tab 17

1

0

--

IN

THAT

CASE

ALSO,

THEN,

IS

"YES",

YOU

DID

i

2
3

FILE PLEADINGS ASKING FOR NO VISITATION RIGHTS; IS THAT
CORRECT?

4

A

WELL, THE OTHER SIDE FILJED PLEADINGS ASKING FOR

J

5
6

IT.

7

MR. SHERLOCK: AT THIS TIME, I'LLOFFER BECAUSE
I WISH TO REFER TO THEM BY EXHIBIT! NUMBERS, 12-D AND 13-

WE RESISTED

IT, IS A MORE ACCURATE WAY TO PHRASE IT.

8
9
10

I

0.

THEY ARE PART OF THE FILE IN PROBATE P 79-2, YOUR HONOR.
i

I THINK IT WOULD BE QUICKER TO DO [THAT THAN KEEP REFERRING
BACK TO THE FILE.

11

THE COURT!

WHAT NUMBERSJARE THEY?
I
MR. SHERLOCK: THEY ARE +-.

12

I

13
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
14

MR. SHERLOCK:

12-D

A^D

TWELVE AND

13-D.
13.

i

15

MR. CHRISTENSEN.'

TWELVE

IS THE FINDINGS OF FACT

16

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND P 79-2 AND 13 IS A MEMORANDUM

17

OF COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS

18

TO BOTH OF THEM AS WHOLLY IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL

19

ANY ISSUE IN THIS CASE.

20
21

THE COURT:

J

IN THE ^AME MATTER.

WE OBJECT
IN

ARE THEY SIGNjED BY A JUDGE OF THIS

COURT?

22

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

23

MR. SHERLOCK:

THE COSJTS AREN'T.
j

THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE

24

SIGNED BY JUDGE BALDWIN.

25

BURSEMENTS ARE SUBMITTED BY MR. WAD5W0RTH.

THE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND DIS-

A£ZJ

1

MR. CHRISTENSEN."

2

THE COURT!

3

THAT'S CORRECT.

WOULD YOU BQTH APPROACH THE BENCH.

YOU BETTER TELL ME WHAT YOU MAKE FOR RELEVANCE ON THAT.
(wHERduPON, A BENCH CONFERENCE
WAS HA|D WITHIN THE PRESENCE
BUT OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE

4
5
6
7
8
9

JURY,1
I'LL SUSTAIN THE OBJECTION TO 13, (OVERRULE THE OBJECTION TO
12.

TWELVE

IS RECEIVED.

PROCEED,! MR. SHERLOCK.

MR. W,ADSWORTH, UPON THE SHOOTING1
1
OF YOUR CLIENT, MARK WHEELER, YOU (DID, DID YOU NOT, UNDER0

(BY MR. SHERLOCK)

10

1

11

TAKE TO MAKE COMMENTS CONCERNING M{R . MANN'S POSSIBLE

12

MENT

13

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND/OR THE! STATE OF UTAH?

14
15
16

17
18

IN THAT

SHOOTING TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

INVOLVE-

IN BOTH

A

WHAT PERIOD

IN TIME?

0

AFTER THE SHOOTING, SHORTLY AFTER THE SHOOTING,

BETWEEN THE SHOOTING AND, LET'S SA[T, THAT FALL.
I

A

WELL, A LOT OF THINGS WENT ON BETWEEN THE SHOOT-

20

THERE WERE SOM^ CONTACTS INITIALLY
WAS NOT MENTIONED.
OF A PROCEDURAL NATURE IN WHICH HE
IN THE HYPNOTIC INTERVIEW,
LATER ON, AFTER HE WAS IDENTIFIED

21

THEN THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION REGKRDING HIM, SO YOU'RE

22

GOING TO HAVE TO BE MORE SPECIFIC.

19

23

ING AND THAT FALL.

MR. SHERLOCK:

I HATE TO|GET

INTO IT, YOUR HONOR,

24 BUT THE WITNESS HAS OPENED IT UP.
25

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

WELL, »fLL MOVE TO STRIKE THAT

163
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H. WAYNE WADSWORTH
of and for
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
310 South Main, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 801/363-3300

**

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT ()F UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
MARK W. WHEELER and SYLVI
WHEELER,
PLAINTIFFS1 ANSWERS TO
INTERROGATORIES

Plaintiffs,
-vs.STANLEY C. MANN and LOUISE S.
MANN,

Civil No. C 79-077^W

Defendants.

Come Now the plaintiffs herein and answer defendants'
interrogatories dated January 18, 1980 as follows:
Interrogatory No. 1:

With respect to the allegation con-

tained in paragraph 19 of the complaint herein that "defendants
thereupon conspired with persons unknown to kill Mark Whpeler",
state the factual basis of said allegation, including:
a.

A particularized statement of each and every fact,

whether or not admissible as evidence, upon which said
allegation is based;
ANSWER:
(1)

Defendants had financial motivation to kill the

plaintiff, Mark Wheeler;
(2)

The plaintiff, Mark Wheeler, had no enemies or

disputes with any other persons other than tt^e
defendant, Stanley Mann; and
(3)

The defendant, Stanley Mann, was seen at the scene

of the shooting by the plaintiff, Sylvi Wheeler.
>.

The identity of each person who has any knowledge,

whether or not such knowledge constitutes admissible
evidence, of any facts which tend to support said allegation;

ANSWER
c.

The plaintiffs herein.

The identity of each and every conversation or

communication which tends to support said allegation;
ANSWER-

Plaintiffs have no knowledge of conversations

relating to the conspiracy, but with respect to the motivation
and state of mind of the defendant, Stanley Mann, the following
conversations are relevant:
(1)

Shortly after the death of Joan Wheeler, Stanley

Mann told Mark Wheeler that he would never see his son,
David Wheeler, again; and
(2) A few days after the shooting incident, Stanley
Mann told Officers Ritter and Pierce of the Los Ajngeles
Police Department of his commitment to Joan Wheeler to do
j

anything possible to prevent Mark Wheeler from obtaining

0

x
D
.

custody of David Wheeler or of managing any trust funds
of David Wheeler in the event of her death.

>
y

d.

The identity of each and every document whicl> contains

<
$
n

any facts, whether or not admissible as evidence, which
tends to support said allegation,
ANSWER:

Plaintiffs know of no documents relating to the

conspiracy, but as to the financial motivation of the defendants
and the desires of Joan Wheeler relating to defendants' commitment
above mentioned, the following documents are relevant:
(1) The Will of Joan Newton Wheeler dated November 27,
1977; and
(2) A letter of Joan Wheeler to the defendants dated
January 23, 1978.
Interrogatory No. 2: With respect to the allegation contained in paragraph 20 of the complaint herein that "in furtherance
of said conspiracy, on Friday, May 11, 1979 at approximately
10:30 p.m., an unknown gunman accousted the plaintiff Mark Wheeler
. . . and shot him at close range with a small caliber handgun",
state the factual basis thereof, including:
a.

A particularized statement of each and every fact,
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whether or not admissible as evidence, upon which said
allegation is based;
b.

The identity of each person who has any knowledge,

whether or not such knowledge constitutes admissible
evidence, of any facts which tend to support said allegation;
c.

The identity of each and every conversation oi

communication which tends to support said allegation;
d.

The identity of each and every document which con-

tains any facts, whether or not admissible as evidence
which tends to support said allegation.
ANSWER:

Plaintiffs assume the gist of this interrogatory

relates to the conspiracy involvement of defendants rather than
^
c

the fact that the plaintiff, Mark Wheeler, was shot as alleged,

i

and with respect to the involvement of defendants, plaintiffs

3

.

have knowledge of no facts other than those referred to ^.n answer

u

to the preceding interrogatory.

u

<

Interrogatory No. 3:

With respect to the allegation con-

tained in paragraph 19 of the complaint that defendants |'realiz[ed]
the appointment of themselves as guardians of David by the Will
of Joan Wheeler could be effective only if the father, Mark
Wheeler, plaintiff herein, was dead or adjudged incapacitated",
state the factual basis thereof, including:
a.

A particularized statement of each and every fact,

whether or not admissible as evidence, upon which said
allegation is based;
ANSWER:
(1)

Defendants were present in the Courtroom^ of

Judge Croft on January 12, 1979, when Judge Croft explained
that fact to defendants' counsel in discussing the provisions of Section 75-5-202, U.C.A., 1953, as amended; and
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(2)

The aforementioned statutory provision was also

referred to on page 3 of Judge Croft's Memorandum Decision
dated January 17, 1979.
b.

The identity of each person who has any knowledge,

whether or not such knowledge constitutes admissible
evidence, of any facts which tend to support said allegation;
ANSWER:

Judge Croft, the Court personnel present, the

parties to this litigation and their respective counsel &t the
January 12, 1979, hearing.
c.

The identity of each and every conversation ot

communication which tends to support said allegation;
ANSWER:

In addition to the conversations involved in the

January 12, 1979 hearing, defendant Stanley Mann acknowledged to
Officers Ritter and Pierce during his interrogation at Salt Lake
City, Utah, that he realized he could not financially profit
from the David Wheeler trust unless he were able to adopt said
minor.

It is assumed that Stanley Mann realized that he could

not adopt the child unless he were first permitted to have
guardianship of the child, which would be precluded if tne Court
awarded the plaintiff Mark Wheeler permanent guardianship of
ihis son.
d.

The identity of each and every document which con-

tains any facts, whether or not admissible as evidence which tends
to support said allegation.
ANSWER:

Judge Croft's Memorandum Decision dated January 17

1979.
Interrogatory No. 4:

With respect to the allegation con-

tained in paragraph 19 herein, that defendants "realiz[ed] there
was little chance of having the plaintiff herein adjudged incapacitated", state the factual basis thereof including:
a.

A particularized statement of each and every fact,

whether or not admissible as evidence, upon which said
allegation is based;
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ANSWER:
(1)

It was obvious at the January 12, 1979, hearing

before Judge Croft that the plaintiff Mark Wheeler was
in good physical and mental health; and
(2)

From the dialogue engaged in between the Court

and counsel at the January 12, 1979, hearing and Judge
Croft's Memorandum Decision relating thereto, it was
evident that the Court did not deem that the plaintiff
Mark Wheeler had forfeited any rights to his minor son and
under the legal standards discussed regarding unfitness,
it would have been apparent to defendants that they had
no evidence of the fact that plaintiff Mark Wheel[er was
an unfit parent.
b.

The identity of each person who has any knowledge,

whether or not such knowledge constitutes admissible
evidence, of any facts which tend to support saia allegation;
ANSWER:
c.

See answer to 3b above.

The identity of each and every conversation dr

communication which tends to support said allegation;
ANSWER:

In addition to the conversations which were part

of the January 12, 1979 hearing above mentioned, the defendant
Stanley Mann approached the plaintiff Mark Wheeler after a court
appearance in Los Angeles, California, and offered money to the
plaintiff Wheeler as an inducement for him to relinquish his
fight for custody of his minor son, which would tend to show that
Stanley Mann did not have serious expectation of showing Mark
Wheeler to be incapacitated or unfit to have custody of his son
when trial of those issues was to take place.
d.

The identity of each and every document whicti con-

tains any facts, whether or not admissible as evidence
which tends to support said allegation.
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ANSWER:

Judge Croft's Memorandum Decision of January 17,

1979.
Interrogatory No. 5:

With respect to the allegations

contained in paragraph 20 of the complaint that an unknown

1

gunman accousted and shot plaintiff Mark Wheeler "in fur therance
of said conspiracy" state the factual basis thereof, including:
a.

A particularized statement of each and every fact,

whether or not admissible as evidence, upon whicji said
allegation is based;
b.

The identity of each person who has any knowledge,

whether or not such knowledge constitutes admissible
evidence, of any facts which tend to support saip allegation;
5
i
0

c.

*

communication which tends to support said allegation;

.

d.

u

u
*
<
<

The identity of each and every conversation 6r

The identity of each and every document whic^i con-

tains any facts, whether or not admissible as evidence
ANSWER: In answer to this interrogatory, plaintiffs are
which tends to support said allegation.
unaware of any facts, witnesses, conversations or documents other
than those referred to in answer to the preceding interrogatories.
Interrogatory No. 6:

Identify all persons whom you con-

tend participated in the conspiracy to kill plaintiff Mfrk W.
Wheeler as alleged in the complaint herein.
ANSWER:

The identity of the persons other than the

defendant Stanley Mann are unknown.
Interrogatory No. 7:

Identify all conversations and

communications which you have had with any police officer or
law enforcement agency regarding:
a.

The conspiracy to kill plaintiff Mark Wheelef as

alleged in the complaint herein;
b.

The assault upon the plaintiff Mark Wheeler as

alleged in the complaint herein.
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ANSWER:

With respect to the assault upon Mark Wheeler,

the plaintiffs have had several conversations with Officers Ritter
and Pierce at plaintiffs' residence, at the Northridge Hospital
and at the Devonshire Police Station.

These conversations in-

volved the defendants only to the extent of advising the^ investigating officers that defendants were the only persons known
to the plaintiffs who could conceivably benefit from the death
of Mark Wheeler and that the defendant Stanley Mann was the only
individual who had recently expressed any animosity or ijard
feelings toward Mark Wheeler.

The only conversations wilth police

officers which would indicate that the defendant Stanley Mann
participated in the attempt to kill Mark Wheeler was the^ interview of Lieutenant William Gaida with Sylvi Wheeler conducted
while Sylvi Wheeler was in a state of hypnosis wherein she identified the defendant Stanley Mann as one of three individuals who
were present at the scene of the shooting.

She did not recognize

the actual assailant as anyone she knew, but she identified
Stanley Mann as standing a short distance away watching the
assault and then the two of them got into an automobile which
was driven by a third person which she never saw.
Interrogatory No. 8:

Identify all documents disclosing

or pertaining to any and all conversations and communications
identified in response to Interrogatory No. 7 above.
ANSWER:

Plaintiffs knew of no documents relating to the

conversations in question other than notes made by the investigating officers.
Interrogatory No. 9:

With respect to the allegations con-

tained in paragraph 14 of the complaint herein that "thi conduct
of defendants in refusing to deliver David to his father [from
December 28, 1978 until January 13. 1979] was willful, *|anton,
and malicious and was done with a reckless disregard for the
legal and lawful rights of the plaintiff Mark Wheeler" state the
factual basis thereof including:
a.

A particularized statement of each and every fact,
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whether or not admissible as evidence, upon which said
allegation is based;
ANSWER:
(1)

Defendants categorically refused to deliver David

Wheeler to his father after the death of Joan Wheeler;
(2)

Defendants attempted to and did obtain ^n ex

parte order of temporary guardianship contrary tc^ the
statutes of the State of Utah;
(3)

In obtaining the order of temporary guardianship,

defendants represented to the Court that they did not
know Mark Wheeler's California address when in

fict

they

did know it, or could have easily obtained it from their
California counsel;
(4)

Defendants continued to resist Mark Wheeler's

efforts to obtain permanent custody of his son e^en after
the Court had awarded him temporary custody and it was
obvious that according to the statutes of the State of
Utah, Mark Wheeler had not abandoned his son and defendants
y

*

had no information of any facts which would constitute
Mark Wheeler unfit to have custody of his son; and
(5)

After Judge Croft advised counsel orally of his

ruling with respect to awarding Mark Wheeler temporary
custody of his son, defendants attempted to frustrate said
order by advising Mark Wheeler through counsel qiat David
had been sent to the State of California,
b.

The identity of each person who has any knowledge,

whether or not such knowledge constitutes admissible
evidence, of any facts which tend to support said allegation;
ANSWER:

Mark Wheeler; the defendants and their counsel in

the custody action; Norma N. Waldman, 19126 Vista Grandp Way,
Northridge, California; Keith R. Haight, 2710 West Temple, County
of Los Angeles, California; William Richard Treu, 10619 Melvin
Avenue, Northridge, California; Robert H. Marshall, M.D., 16260
Ventura Boulevard, Encino, California; and Officers Ritter and
Pierce.
-8-

c.

The identity of each and every conversation dr

communication which tends to support said allegation;
ANSWER:

See the deposition transcripts of the aqove men-

tioned individuals.
d.

The identity of each and every document which con-

tains any facts, whether or not admissible as evidence,
which tends to support said allegation.
ANSWER.

Plaintiffs know of no documents other than those

heretofore identified in these answers to interrogatories and
the documents filed in the custody action.
Interrogatory No. 10:

State whether or not plairitiff Mark

Wheeler requested that the court award him attorneys fees in
the action entitled in the matter of:

David Mark Newton^ Wheeler,

o

a minor filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake

*

County, State of Utah, Probate No. P 79-2.

5

anything other than a unqualified negative, state the fallowing:

If your answer is

£

a.

The sum of attorneys fees which you requested;

*

b.

The disposition made by the court of such request;

5
<

c.

The identity of each and every document reflecting

to or pertaining to said request for attorneys fe|es and
the disposition made by the court of said request.
ANSWER:

Plaintiffs claimed attorneys fees in th4ir cost

bill filed at the conclusion of the custody case.
a.

$6,056.25.

b.

On defendants' motion to tax petitioner Wheeljer's

cost bill in the custody case, the Court stated t[hat the
custody action was not the type of an action in which
attorneys fees could be awarded and denied petitioner
Wheeler's request for a substantive hearing on tl|e amount
of attorneys fees claimed.
c.

Petitioner Wheeler's Memorandum of Disbursements and

Costs dated August 31, 1979, filed in the custody case,
Probate No. P 79-2.

The Court denied the request as

explained above.
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Interrogatory No. 11;

State whether or not since December

28, 1978 you have received any care or treatment from anV medical
doctor or any other person for mental and/or emotional distress.
If your answer is anything other than an unqualified negative state
the following:
a.

The identity of each such medical doctor or person

from whom you have received such treatment; and
b.

The identity of each and every document reflecting

or pertaining to such care and treatment.
ANSWER:

Marfc Wheeler received a psychiatric consultation

while at the Northridge Hospital from a psychiatrist whoie name
he does not now recall.

As a result of that consultation, the

psychiatrist did not believe further psychiatric treatment was
2

necessary.

However, it was recommended that Sylvi Wheeler re-

!
<
^
>

,ceive psychiatric treatment to help her cope with the situation

5

strained economic circumstances inflicted upon the plaintiffs

of having seen her liusband shot in front of her, but due to the

y

5

as a result of the ^hooting of Mark Wheeler, such psychiatric
treatment was never received.

A reference to the psychiatric

consultation received by Mark Wheeler is probably contained
within the Northridge Hospital chart reflecting his admission
and treatment at said hospital.

WAYNE WADSWORTH
of and for
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, 12th Flobr
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs!
STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH, after having been first duly sworn,
deposes and says that he is one of plaintiffs' attorneys^ and as
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such has been authorized by the plaintiffs who are non-residents
of the State of Utah to file the foregoing ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES on their behalf and that the information contained
therein is true and correct according to the information he has
received to date from his clients and other sources as reflected
in his file of this action.

f

\YNE WADSWORTU
WAYNE
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /c/

day [of

February, 1980.

C
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: ^

/. i. Xf
*JL*

"

*

<; '

'*/

My Commission Expires:

^s ^J
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS1 ANSWERS TO
INTERROGATORIES to Gordon L. Roberts, Esq. and Raymond J.
Etcheverry, Esq., PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER, Attorneys fcpr
Defendants, 79 South State Street, P. 0. Box 11898, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84147, this

/^/

day of February, 1980.

T
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PILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE

TSalt Lake County Utah

PAUL H. LIAPIS
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Defendant
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-6996

3rd EM«t- Court

-^

_

P^puty CJerfc

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT IJ^KE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

In the matter of

OBJECTION TO DECREE

DAVID MARK NEWTON WHEELER,

Probate No. P-79-2

A Minor.

Comes now the Petitioners Stanley C. Mann and Louise S.
Mann and hereby object to the Decree filed with the court in
the above entitled matter.

Said objection|made on the grounds

and for the following reasons.
That the court in its decision did noit award the Petitioner
Mark Wayne Wheeler any costs of this court I in this action. In
addition Petitioners further object that the Petitioner Mark
Wayne Wheeler has interpreted the term costs of action to award
the attorney fee in his filing of his Memorandum of Disbursement
and Costs the same not being intended or awarded by the court
during the trial or in its minute entry following the filing
of Memorandums with regard to visitation.
WHEREFORE, Petitioners Stanley C. Mannl and Louise S. Mann
hereby move the court to require Petitionees attorney to strike
Paragraph 3 of the Decree
DATED this

5"

day of September, 197|9
GUSTIHL ADAMSL

TING & LIAPIS

PAUL H
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection was mailed, postage prepaidi to H. Wayne Wadsworth,
Esq., at 310 South Main, L^h Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101,
postage prepaid, this ? ^ day of SerfE&mber, 197^

i » <j3nitMi.iUt.iira. r—
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Tab 20

PAUL H. LIAPIS
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorney for Defendant
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Teleohone:
532-6996

FJLED |!N CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah
W. 8terUng|
j E v w i , Clerk 3rd Ditt. Qourt
Deputy C4crk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of:
DAVID MARK NEWTON WHEELER,

ORDER TJAXING COSTS

a Minor.
)
PETITIONER

Probate No. P 79-2

MANN'S Motion to Tax Costs (having come

on regularly for hearing before the Honorable t m e s t F.
Baldwin, Jr., one of the Judges of the above-entitled court
on the 13th day of September, 1979, Petitioner | WHEELER
appearing by and through his attorney, H. Wayn^ Wadsworth,
and Petitioner MANN appearing by and through his attorney,
Paul H. Liapis, the matter having been argued to the court
with regard to Petitioner Wheeler's Memorandum of Disbursements and Costs, and the court also having hearjd argument
with regards to Petitioner Mann's Objection to Decree with
regards to the awarding of costs therein, and the court
having reviewed the files and records herein, and having
taken the matter under advisemen£ and having is^sued its
Written Memorandum Decision and upon Motion of Paul H. Liapis,
attorney for Petitioner Mann:
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED:
1.

Petitioner Wheeler's Memorandum of Disbursements

of Costs requesting reimbursement for air travel of Petitioner
Wheeler on January 12, 1979, June 20, 1979 and fuly 2 3 , 1979,
and being the same is hereby denied.
2.

Petitioner Wheeler's request for coits for

witness fees for the January 12, 1979 hearing fq>r Donald

*s

Waldman, Dent Hale,

Roger Hacking, Marilyn Mix being the
i

same is hereby taxed against the Petitioner Mann for a total
sum of $244.40.
3.

Petitioner Wheeler's request! to tax costs for

the witness fee of Sylvi
12,

Wheeler on the hearing January

19 79 being the same is hereby denied.
4.

Petitioner Wheeler's request to tax costs as

witness fees for Sylvi

Wheeler and attorney fees for his

attorney being the same is hereby deniedl
5.

Petitioner Wheeler's request to tax costs for

the Depositions of Dr. Robert Marshall, William Richard
Treu, Keith R. Haight and Norma N. Waldmin being the same
is hereby granted, in the sum of $281.60k f

*

DATteD this \M_^> day of September^-1979 .

ATTEST

Ov / ^

CUT^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify on this / 7 dayl of September a
true &nd correct copy of the above Order taxing Costs was
mailed, postage prepaid to H. WayrieOjtedswortJi/ 310 South
M a m , 12th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 8410;

I

1--

ZK
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plaintiff, all of which are false:
(a)

On I^se 12, the Book states that the plaintiff par-

ticipated

in barratry and (champerty

in the followinc

language:
"I fully believed thafestoark would let the
matter drop* He would nave, too, if only
both
of
his
brother s\in-law, Wayne
Wadsworth and David Youhg, had not
advised him.
They tjjtought t>here was a
good chance.that if ^lejgained cqstody of
the boy, (&0 could still get corH^ol of
the trust money."
(b)

On Page

42, the Book

states that the plaintif

bribed a prospective witnesp,

Dr. Robert H. Marshall

for the apparent purpose of giving false testimony, a
his deposition in the following language:

.t,

ou$

"The hearing brought out a number of
facts that appalled me. First, it seemed
'that Sylvi and Wadsworth (her brother-inlaw, remember), had 'bought1 the testimony of an incompetentTWocWIT*whose words
simply aped Sylvifs and Mark's opinions.

^f%h

f^Ju^
(c)

On Page

43, the Book

states that the plaintif

misdirected the Court in th^ following language:
EBjut what hurt most w^s Wheeler's
and
the
M^j *

Wadsworth's
Court.

And,

unfortunately

to

misdirec
for

Davie

they succeeded. . . .

- 6 -
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four times a day. I couldn't believe this was the same child
we held in our arms only six months earlier. That sturdy,
robust little man!
Our attorney was unable to assert an^ evidence of relationship between the boy and ourselves; consequently David
was awarded to the custody of Mark and his new wife Sylvi,
whom the doctor commended for having done a remarkable
job with David. In view of the fact that Mark had been critically shot after David went to live with the Wheelers, I would
assume that any degree of "stabilizing \ was remarkable.
What a situation for a boy only four ye^rs old!
The hearing brought out a number of facts that appalled
me. First, it seemed that Sylvi and Wads^|vorth (her brotherin-law, remember) had "bought 7 ' the testimony of an incompetent doctor whose words simply aped Sylvi's and Mark's
opinions. Second, the Wheelers had obviously prompted the
boy to respond in a negative way toward Joan, Louise, and
me. Third, the Wheelers seemed to be the <poctor's only source
of information. Not only had he made nd> effort to get to the
bottom of David's problem, he was actually misinformed.
The doctor testified under oath that Divid saw his father
shot, but Mark testified under oath at a later date that this
was not so. In short, the doctor simply! reinforced Mark's
attitude toward Joan, and, as a matter of record, the doctor's
testimony was largely made up of quotations from Sylvi.
The last time I saw Mark at the time cpf the divorce settlement, when he tried to pick up the house check, he appeared
extreme in dress. Louise didn't even recognize him. His hair
was long and he had a string of beads around his neck. On
January 11th he cleaned up. This was the custody hearing and
apparently he went to a lot of trouble to look conservative.
Obviously other preparations had been i^iade for the hearing
as well.
The Wheelers' main witness was Ddctor Robert H. Marshall, whose testimony cut me to the qui^rk. I couldn't believe
42
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Punctuation, Mechanics, and Manuscript Form

3 . Use parentheses t o enclose figures and letters in t h e t e x t
of a piece of writing t o indicate order of enumeration.
The subjects of the medieval quadrivium were (1) arithmetic,
(2) geometry. (3) astronomy, and (4) music.
4 # Use parentheses t o enclose cross-references.
The amount of this yearly increase is astonishing (see Appendix A).
"Unexceptionable" is not to be confused with "unexceptional"
(consult the dictionary).
5. Use parentheses in formal business transactions t o c o n firm a s u m previously g i v e n in words.
I enclose my check for five hundred dollars ($500.00) to cover
payment in full.
6. T h e c o n v e n t i o n s governing the u s e of parentheses w i t h
other marks of p u n c t u a t i o n are as follows:
a . W h e n a complete sentence w i t h i n parentheses s t a n d s
alone (that is, not as part of another sentence), t h e
terminal punctuation is enclosed within parentheses.
He said that knowledge is sometimes useful. (That must be the
unexceptionable statement of the century.)
b . W h e n a complete sentence w i t h i n parentheses is part
of another sentence:
• I t does not begin w i t h a capital letter unless t h e first
word is a proper noun.
• N o period is used w i t h i n the parentheses.
• If it is a question, a question mark is used w i t h i n t h e
parentheses.
Later in his Preface on Bosses in his volume of plays of 1936, he
was back praising Mussolini again and even throwing a few land
words to Hitler, whom he described as "not a stupid German"
(did Bernard Shaw prefer a crazy Austrian?) and whose persecution of the Jews he characterized considerately as "a craze,
a complex, a bee in his bonnet, a hole in his armor, a hitch in his
statesmanship, one of those lesions which sometimes prove fatal."
(Edmund Wilson)
c W h e n a word, phrase, or clause w i t h i n parentheses is
part of a sentence:
• A c o m m a , semicolon, or period is never u s e d after t h e
last word in the parentheses.
• A c o m m a , semicolon, or period is u s e d following t h e
second parenthesis o n l y if t h e sentence w i t h o u t t h e
parenthetical material requires p u n c t u a t i o n a t t h a t
point.
• A question mark or exclamation mark is u s e d w i t h i n
the parentheses if it applies t o t h e material w i t h i n t h e
parentheses.
But the man finds himself faced with the question he imagines
the horse to be asking: what is there to stop for out there in the
cold, away from bin and stall (house and village and mankind?)
and all that any self-respecting beast could value on such a
night? (John Ciardi)
7. In a t y p e d manuscript a parenthesis w i t h i n a sentence
is separated from t h e words o n either side of it b y a single
space. A sentence standing b y itself w i t h i n parentheses is
separated from the preceding and following sentences b y
two spaces.

Quotation Marks [ " " ]
1. Use quotation marks t o enclose all direct q u o t a t i o n s .
"Are you." she asked, "the man who helped my son?"
Yes," he said, "I helped him. I didn't do much, though."
2. Use single quotation marks to enclose a q u o t a t i o n w i t h i n
another quotation.
In Literary Symbolism, Maurice Beebe says, "Mary McCarthy
admits that a writer does not always know beforehand just what
he intends to accomplish in a story, which is always for him,
as well as for the reader, 'a little act of discovery.' "
*• Use quotation marks t o enclose titles of articles, chapters
of a book, essays, short stories, short p o e m s , a n d musical
c
om positions.
The third chapter, "Some Solutions to the Problem," is perhaps
the most valuable in the book.
yne of Emerson's characteristic essays ia "Self Reliance."
• enjoyed Steinbeck's short story "The Leader of the People."
2>ne made us memorize the poem "Dover Beach," which none
<* us liked.
She sang "Over the Bounding Waves" loudly and with appropnate gestures.
*•01Use
quotation marks t o enclose words s p o k e n of as
ff ^.03,3 Wmoar d
s used e in
special seni ; s , or words emphasized.
y a
^j
^*° b u s e d in such cases.)
5°n>e people consider that all such words as "good," "bad,"
t*»utiful," "ugly" only indicate one's own emotional reactions
•°w*rds actions or things and in no sense properties of the
Jftions or things themselves. (Robert H. Thouless)
J 0 ^ ** assumed to be always "brute" power, crude, ugly, and
Jjndiscnminating, the way an elephant appears to be. (Lionel
^ TnlUng)
• ^ s e indentation and single spacing with no q u o t a t i o n
J****5 for a quotation of more t h a n three or four lines.
. G e n e r a l l y speaking, do not use q u o t a t i o n marks to ret j - ? 1 ^ a n g « If the slang expression is the best and m o s t
J**** expression for the context, then use it w i t h o u t the
° g y of quotation marks; if it is not, putting it in q u o -

t a t i o n marks probably will n o t improve it or m a k e it
acceptable.
-^,
7. T h e conventions governing t h e use of quotation marks
w i t h other forms of punctuation are as follows:
a . T h e c o m m a and t h e period are always enclosed within
quotation marks.
"I'm sorry," he said, '•but I don't believe you,"
b . T h e colon and semicolon are never enclosed within
quotation marks.
I had not read Francis Bacon's essay, "Of Truth"; in fact,
I had never heard of it.
c T h e dash, question mark, a n d exclamation mark are
enclosed within quotation marks if t h e y apply t o the
q u o t e d material. T h e y are placed after the quotation
marks if t h e y apply t o t h e whole sentence.
"Am I going too?" she asked.
Did she say, "I am going too"?

Brackets [ ]
1. Use brackets t o enclose m a t t e r w h i c h y o u insert in the
t e x t of a q u o t e d passage t o explain, c o m m e n t , or correct.
"He was born in 1805 (actually in 18021 in . . . . "
According to Tim* magazine, "It [Rabbit, Run] was a flawlessly
turned portrait of a social cripple who understood somehow
that, running, he was more alive than he would be standing still."
2 . Use brackets t o enclose t h e L a t i n word sic, meaning
" t h u s , " w h e n y o u insert it into a q u o t a t i o n following a
mistake in fact, spelling, grammar, e t c t o indicate t o the
reader t h a t y o u are quoting verbatim from your source and
t h a t the mistake was in your source a n d w a s not yours.
"Andrew Johnson never attended school and was scarcely able
to read when he met Eliza McCardle, whom he married on
May 5, 1927 {sic}."
3 . I n a t y p e d manuscript insert brackets in ink if your
typewriter lacks these characters.

Apostrophe [' ]
1. U s e the apostrophe t o indicate t h e possessive case of the
n o u n or pronoun.
the student's book
John's golf clubs
one's obligation
2 . a . For nouns not ending in s a d d t h e apostrophe followed b y s.
children's shoes
dog's collar
men's suits
b . For singular nouns ending in a n x, JA, or s sound, the
possessive is formed either b y adding t h e apostrophe to
t h e final s or b y adding t h e apostrophe a n d another s.
Tames' book or James's book
Mr. Jones' house or Mr. Jones's house
conscience' sake or conscience's sake
c For plural nouns ending in a n s, sh, or s sound, use the
apostrophe alone.
the Joneses* house
dogs' collars
the ladies' purses
d . I n compound constructions place t h e apostrophe and
s o n the word standing i m m e d i a t e l y before the word
being modified.
the King of England's daughter
anyone else's opinion
sister-in-law's cousin
e . Joint possession is d e n o t e d b y adding t h e apostrophe
a n d s t o the last name o n l y or t o all t h e names.
Wendy, Tony, and Christopher's home
Wendy's, Tony's, and Christopher's home
f. Separate ownership is d e n o t e d b y t h e apostrophe and
s after each name and t h e plural form of the modified
word.
Wendy's, Tony's, and Christopher's homes
Selma s and Debbie's typewriters
3 . U s e t h e apostrophe t o indicate t h e omission of letters
or figures.
we've, won't, it's, can't, '69
4 . Use a n apostrophe t o indicate the plurals of figures,
letters, and words referred t o a s such.
Watch your p's and q's.
There are too many 5's in the number.
There are too many "and's" in your sentence.
It was a party of VJ.P.'s.
5. D o not use the apostrophe w i t h the personal and relat i v e pronouns t o indicate possession.
Is it yours? (not 1$ it your's?)
Its color is faded, (not It's color is faded.)
6. T h e apostrophe is often o m i t t e d in t h e names of organizations.
Teachers College
Citizens Bank
Ladies Aid Society
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March 2, 1988

CERTIFIED MAIL

Mr. David Yokum
Salt Lake County Attorney
2001 So. State Street
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84115

Dear Dave:

Arrangements have been made for a copy of the Brief filed with the
Appellate Court, on February 19, 1988, to be delivered to you. I have
been informed by the Appellate Court that changes, such as those in the
Therefore, I ffelt it my responsibility to
Brief, are criminal in nature
bring them to your attention. All are felonies and were committed by
Officers of the Court.
Inc'luded with the Brief is a copy of the
statement, signed under oath by two officer^ of the Court, H. Nayne
Wadsworth on his own behalf and James P. Cowlet, as an Officer of the Law
Firm of Natkiss & Campbell, a professional corporation (R. 879-893) which
clearly affirms the destruction of documents,! a felony, in violation of
Utah Statute 76-8-510, The Brief affirms perjury, in violation of Utah
Code 76-8-501, 502, 503, 504, 505 by the abov^ two parties and David S.
Young, currently a Third District Judge.
The Brief affirms Deceit &
Collusion, in violation of Utah Code 78-51-31 by the above parties and
R. Ray Christensen, attorney.
If the question of Statute of Limitations should arise, I can supply
documentation of the acts. The act of destruction of documents is still
within the Statute of Limitations and will be for at least another 120
days.
As I understand, this matter would fall under your jurisdiction. If
this is not correct, I would appreciate you letiing me know at once whose
jurisdiction it would fall under.
If an Officer of the Court is allowed to destroy evidence to deny
another individual his right to a fair trial, on the merits, the veracity
of our entire judicial system is destroyed, t have confidence that you
will not allow this serious threat to our judicial system go unaddressed.
The evidence relating to this matter is fojjnd in the Brief beginning
on Page 4, Statement of Facts, through Page 52. In addition to what is
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contained in the Record, I have other documents which relate to this
matter and which show that R. Ray Christensdn had in his possession
documentation detailing the felonious acts of the above individuals prior
to filing Motions in the Court contrary to those documents, which I would
be happy to turn over relative to your investigation.
It is not unreasonable to expect that the training of both Mr.
Wadsworth and Mr. Young would preclude their ac p o n s during the first few
weeks after the shooting.
These actions inc" uded making an ex-parte
visit to a judge, R. 4A, Pg. 82^ through 83. a hd R. 5A, Pg. 203 through
223, a visit to a General Authority of the L. D. S. Church, R 5A? Pg.
224 through 236. contacting law enforcement officers both on the local
and national level R. 4A, Pg. 82 through 83. aihd R. 5A, Pg. 203 through
223 u and inferring involvement of individuals in such a serious crime
actions would not be
without one single piece of evidence.
Thes
associated with a reasonable rational person, let alone an attorney,
unless there was an ulterior motive.
If I can be of any further help, please let fne know.

Sincerely,

Stanley£r.

Mann

P. O.Jfox 27317
Salt take City, jut. 84127-0317
Tele: (801) 278-^9460
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